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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review orders of 
the Labor Commission Appeals Board pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 34A-1-303(6). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the Labor Commission Appeals Board erred when it 
held that the balance of the proceeds from a third-party tort 
action must be applied to reduce the workers' compensation 
insurer's future obligations under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106(5). 
The petitioners are not entitled to relief unless they 
establish that they have been "substantially prejudiced" and that 
the "agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law." Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (4) (d) . This issue involves the interpreta-
tion of section 34A-2-106 (5) , which is reviewed under a correction 
of error standard. E.g., Luckau v. Board of Review, 840 P.2d 811, 
813 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
2. Whether the petitioners may challenge the Labor 
Commission's order requiring discounting of future payments in 
determining the duration of CNA's offset, where the petitioners 
failed to oppose CNA's request for discounting when it was 
presented to the Commission. 
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The resolution of this issue does not require the "review" of 
any decisions made by the Commission, so no standard of review is 
applicable. 
3. Whether the Labor Commission abused its discretion in 
recognizing that money in hand is worth more than a payment to be 
made years in the future, and so discounted CNA's future 
obligations to their present value in applying the offset 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106(5). 
This issue involves the Commission's interpretation and 
application of its own regulations, which is entitled to 
significant deference under UAPA. Union Pacific Ry. v. Auditing 
Div., 842 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1992). Such a decision will not be 
overturned unless the Commission abused its discretion. Id. 
In the alternative, this issue involves the application of a 
statute, and the Commission has been granted discretion to apply 
the Workers' Compensation Act under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-3 01. 
The Commission's application of the Act will not be reversed unless 
its decision "exceeded the bounds of reasonableness and ration-
ality." Osman Home Improvement v. Industrial Commission, 342 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 7, 8 (Ct. App. April 30, 1998). 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-301 
The commission has the duty and the full power, 
jurisdiction, and authority to determine the facts and 
apply the law in this chapter or any other title or 
chapter it administers. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106 
(1) When any injury or death for which compensation 
is payable under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act is caused by the wrongful act or 
neglect of a person other than an employer, officer, 
agent, or employee of the employer: 
(a) the injured employee, or in case of death, 
the employee's dependents, may claim compensation; and 
(b) the injured employee or the employee's 
heirs or personal representative may have an action for 
damages against the third person. 
(2) (a) If compensation is claimed and the 
employer or insurance carrier becomes obligated to pay 
compensation, the employer or insurance carrier: 
(i) shall become trustee of the 
cause of action against the third party; and 
(ii) may bring and maintain the 
action either in its own name or in the name 
of the injured employee, or the employee's 
heirs or the personal representative of the 
deceased. 
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(a), an 
employer or insurance carrier may not settle and release 
a cause of action of which it is a trustee under 
Subsection (2)(a) without the consent of the commission. 
(3) (a) Before proceeding against a third party, 
to give a person described in Subsections (3) (a) (i) and 
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(ii) a reasonable opportunity to enter an appearance in 
the proceeding, the injured employee or, in case of 
death, the employee's heirs, shall give written notice of 
the intention to bring an action against the third party 
to: 
(i) the carrier; and 
(ii) any other person obligated for 
the compensation payments. 
(b) The injured employee, or, in case of 
death, the employee's heirs, shall give written notice to 
the carrier and other person obligated for the 
compensation payments of any known attempt to attribute 
fault to the employer, officer, agent, or employee of the 
employer: 
(i) by way of settlement; or 
(ii) in a proceeding brought by the 
injured employee, or, in case of death, the 
employee's heirs. 
(5) If any recovery is obtained against a third 
person, it shall be disbursed in accordance with 
Subsections (5)(a) through (c). 
(a) The reasonable expense of the action, 
including attorneys' fees, shall be paid and charged 
proportionately against the parties as their interests 
may appear. Any fee chargeable to the employer or 
carrier is to be a credit upon any fee payable by the 
injured employee or, in the case of death, by the 
dependents, for any recovery had against the third party. 
(b) The person liable for compensation 
payments shall be reimbursed, less the proportionate 
share of costs and attorneys' fees provided for in 
Subsection (5)(a), for the payments made as follows: 
(i) without reduction based on 
fault attributed to the employer, officer, 
agent, or employee of the employer in the 
action against the third party if the combined 
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percentage of fault attributed to persons 
immune from suit is determined to be less than 
40% prior to any reallocation of fault under 
Subsection 78-27-39(2); or 
(ii) less the amount of payments 
made multiplied by the percentage of fault 
attributed to the employer, officer, agent, or 
employee of the employer in the action against 
the third party if the combined percentage of 
fault attributed to persons immune from suit 
is determined to be 40% or more prior to any 
reallocation of fault under Subsection 
78-27-39(2) . 
(c) The balance shall be paid to the injured 
employee, or the employee's heirs in case of death, to be 
applied to reduce or satisfy in full any obligation 
thereafter accruing against the person liable for 
compensation. 
Utah Admin. Code R568-1-11 (repealed eff. July 1, 1997) 
Eight percent shall be used for any discounting or 
present value calculations. Lump sums ordered by the 
Commission of any permanent partial benefit award as per 
Section 35-1-79, U.C.A., or for any attorney fees paid in 
a single up-front amount instead of across the length of 
an award up to 312 week maximum allowed by Rule R568-1-7, 
or of any other sum being paid earlier than normally paid 
under a weekly benefit method shall be subject to the 8% 
discounting. The Commission shall create and make 
available a precise discount or present value table based 
on a 3 65 day year. For those instances where discount 
calculations are not routinely utilized or where the 
Commission's table is not available, the following table, 
which is a shortened version of the precise table, may be 
utilized by interpolating between the stated weeks and 
the related discount. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is a Petition for Review of an Order of the Labor 
Commission Appeals Board holding that respondents Redd Roofing & 
Construction Co. and CNA Insurance Company are entitled to an 
offset against their future workers' compensation obligations to 
the petitioners in the amount of $68,507.97. (Addendum Exhibit 1.) 
This amount was the balance remaining from an action against a 
third-party tortfeasor whose negligence contributed to the indus-
trial accident that claimed the life of Mr. Edward Esquivel, the 
petitioners' decedent. The Order further provided that the 
respondents' future obligations to the petitioners had to be 
discounted to their present value in determining the duration of 
the offset represented by the money recovered in the third-party 
tort action. 
Course of Proceedings 
The petitioners, dependents of Mr. Edward Esquivel, filed an 
application for hearing with the Industrial Commission on July 17, 
1996, claiming that respondents Redd Roofing and CNA had illegally 
stopped making benefit payments. R. 106-07. The Esquivels alleged 
that they were entitled to continued payments as compensation for 
the death of Mr. Esquivel, who died in an industrial accident 
working for Redd Roofing on April 26, 1993. Id. CNA filed an 
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answer on August 16, 1996, explaining that it had ceased payments 
because of the money the Esquivels had recovered from the third-
party tort action. R. 112-15. CNA further explained that under 
the Workers' Compensation Act it was entitled to a reimbursement of 
benefits paid prior to that date and an offset against future 
obligations. Id. 
On February 7, 1997, the Honorable Judge Benjamin A. Sims, 
Administrative Law Judge, entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and an Order ("ALJ Findings") directing CNA to immediately 
resume making weekly compensation payments to the Esquivels, 
without any offset. R. 161-69 (Addendum Exhibit 2). On March 7, 
1997, CNA filed a Motion for Review with the Industrial Commission. 
R. 170-90 (Addendum Exhibit 3) . While the matter was pending 
before the Commission, the 1997 amendments to the Workers1 
Compensation Act went into effect. The Industrial Commission 
ceased its eighty-year existence, and the matter was referred to 
the newly created Labor Commission Appeals Board. R. 261. On 
January 14, 1998, the Appeals Board issued an Order Granting Motion 
for Review ("Order") , holding that CNA was entitled to an offset in 
an amount equal to the balance remaining from the third-party 
action after the attorney fees and costs of the litigation were 
paid. Addendum Exhibit 1, R. 262-65. The Esquivels timely filed 
their petition for review of that order on February 13, 1998. 
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Statement of Facts 
On April 26, 1993, the decedent, Edward Esquivel, sustained a 
fatal injury when he fell off a roof while working for respondent 
Redd Roofing & Construction Company, who was insured by respondent 
CNA Insurance Company. ALJ Findings, Addendum Exhibit 2, R. 161. 
In early 1994, the Esquivels received $375,000 in a settlement from 
Freeport Center Associates, the owner of the building on which the 
accident happened. Id. R. 164. The Esquivels and CNA then entered 
into an agreement, formalized by a Stipulated Order, requiring CNA 
to pay $2 05 per week for as long as the dependents were entitled to 
receive death benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act.1 Id. 
R. 162. CNA also agreed to accept $8,263.84 to satisfy its 
workers' compensation lien rights accruing up until that point. 
Id. R. 161. This agreement was approved by the Commission on March 
7, 1994. R. 14. 
The Esquivels then pursued another third-party tort action, 
against Gravely International, the maker of the roof-sweeper Mr. 
Esquivel was using when the accident occurred. ALJ Findings, R. 
163. However, the Esquivels failed to notify CNA that they were 
pursuing this other action, and they failed to notify CNA of 
Gravely's attempt to attribute a portion of the fault to Redd 
Roofing. Id. This failure to notify CNA violated subsections 
(3)(a) and (3)(b) of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-62 (now § 34A-2-106). 
xThis figure represents the statutory maximum rate at the time 
of the accident, $341, times sixty percent. 
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In the action against Gravely, the jury found that the total 
damages were $814,029, and fault was apportioned as follows: 
twenty-five percent to Gravely, fifty percent to Redd Roofing, and 
twenty-five percent to Edward Esquivel. Id. R. 165. Therefore, on 
April 9, 1996, Judge Tena Campbell entered an order awarding the 
Esquivels $203,507.25. Id. The costs of pursuing this action were 
$53,596.38, and the attorneys' fees amounted to $81,402.90, which 
was forty percent of the gross judgment, and fifty-four percent of 
the judgment remaining after the costs were paid. Id. R. 167. 
Thus, the balance remaining after the costs and fees were paid was 
$68,507.97. Id. 
After the judgment was entered, CNA stopped making weekly 
benefit payments, because the Workers' Compensation Act provides 
that a workers' compensation insurer has a right of reimbursement 
and future credit for any money recovered in a third-party action 
by an injured employee or his dependents. Id. R. 161. CNA's most 
recent payment was made on March 27, 1996, covering the period 
through April 1, 1996. R. 172-73. From the time of the 1994 
settlement agreement until March 27, 1996, CNA had paid a total of 
$21,320. ALJ Findings, R. 166. Also, under the Workers' 
Compensation Act, a child of a deceased worker is conclusively 
presumed to be dependent until he or she turns eighteen, and Mr. 
Esquivel's youngest child will not turn eighteen until January 5, 
2 008. Thus, at the time the Esquivels received their tort award, 
CNA was obligated to make payments for approximately another 617 
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weeks. The nominal value of CNA's future obligation at that time 
was approximately $126,602, id. R. 166, but the then-present value 
was $83,000. Commission Order, Exhibit 1, R. 263. 
The Esquivels filed their application for hearing, asking the 
Commission to require CNA to continue making the $2 05 weekly 
payments with no credit for the Esquivels' receipt of the tort 
proceeds. R. 106-07. CNA opposed because the governing statute, 
section 35-1-62(5), provided that (1) after the proceeds of a tort 
recovery are used to pay the reasonable expenses of the litigation, 
the workers' compensation insurer is entitled to receive a 
reimbursement for amounts already paid, and (2) any remaining 
"balance" must be used to offset the insurer's future obligations. 
R. 112-15. 
On February 7, 1997, the Honorable Benjamin A. Sims, 
Administrative Law Judge, entered his Findings, concluding that the 
Esquivels were entitled to keep the entire $68,507.97 with 
absolutely no offset or benefits to CNA. Exhibit 2, R. 161-68. 
The ALJ reasoned that CNA's past and future obligations under the 
Workers' Compensation Act totalled $147,922, so CNA's "interest" in 
the recovery from the tort action was that amount. Id. R. 166. 
The ALJ further reasoned, however, that CNA could only have an 
interest in the net recovery. Id. R. 167. The ALJ therefore took 
the $203,507 gross judgment, subtracted the $81,402.90 in fees and 
the $53,596 in costs, and concluded that CNA's interest was 
"reduced to $68,507.97." Id. The ALJ then reasoned that, since 
-10-
CNA was "potentially entitled" to the entire net judgment because 
of its priority under the Workers' Compensation Act, it had to be 
charged the entire amount of the costs and fees: "Since CNA has a 
claim for 100 percent of the net recovery, it must pay 100 percent 
of the attorneys' fees and costs." Id. Then, even though he had 
just subtracted the fees and costs in reducing CNA's interest to 
$68,507, the ALJ subtracted the fees and costs again: "Since CNA's 
proportionate share of fees and costs is $134,999.28, CNA's lien 
must be reduced by that amount." Id. The ALJ therefore concluded 
that, even though there was a balance of $68,507.97 remaining from 
the tort action, "CNA is thus not given any credit for any offset 
or reimbursement." Id. 
CNA thus filed its motion for review. Exhibit 3, R. 170-84. 
In its motion, CNA explained that the statute plainly required that 
the "balance" must be used to offset the workers' compensation 
insurer's future obligations. Id. R. 176-77. CNA also pointed out 
that the ALJ had mistakenly subtracted the fees and costs twice in 
denying CNA its offset, and CNA noted that the ALJ's order ended up 
charging CNA with all the expenses of the tort action while giving 
it none of the benefits. la. R. 177-78. CNA further pointed out 
that the ALJ's order gave the Esquivels a double recovery because 
it allowed them to receive the full amount of the tort proceeds and 
the full amount of their workers' compensation benefits. Id. R. 
180. Finally, CNA noted that Commission regulations required the 
use of discounting to present value in determining the effect of 
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lump sum payments in lieu of weekly benefits, and that discounting 
must be applied to determine the duration of the offset CNA 
received from the tort proceeds. Id. R. 180-83. CNA therefore 
requested an order that CNA not be required to resume weekly 
payments until January 23, 2005. Id. R. 174. 
The Esquivels opposed the motion, once again claiming that the 
fees and costs had to be subtracted from the net judgment (that is, 
the amount remaining after the fees and costs had already been 
subtracted) in determining the insurer's offset. Exhibit 4, R. 
201. Notably, the Esquivels never opposed CNA's request that the 
Commission apply discounting. Id. R. 191-205. 
On January 14, 1998, the Labor Commission Appeals Board 
entered its Order Granting Motion for Review. Exhibit 1, R. 262-
65. The Commission recognized that the plain language of the 
governing statute grants the insurer a "first right of 
reimbursement and offset" once the expenses of the tort litigation 
are paid. Id. R. 2 64. The Commission agreed that because CNA had 
all the interest in the proceeds, it would be charged all the fees 
and costs, but the Commission correctly subtracted the expenses 
only once, so it concluded that there was a "balance" remaining of 
$68,507.97. Id. The Commission then reasoned that because the 
statute required that the "balance" be "applied to reduce" the 
insurer's future obligations, CNA was entitled to "use the third 
party award to offset its obligation to make weekly payments to the 
dependents, until such time as the award has been exhausted." Id. 
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Finally, the Commission ordered that CNA be allowed to use the 
eight percent discount rate in determining when the lump sum award 
was exhausted. Id. 
The Esquivels now bring this petition for review. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Workers' Compensation Act explicitly provides that after 
the expenses of a third-party tort action are paid, any remaining 
"balance" must be used to offset the insurer's future workers' 
compensation obligations to the injured employee. In our case, 
there was clearly a balance of $68,507.97 remaining from the tort 
proceeds after the attorney fees and costs were paid. Therefore, 
the Labor Commission Appeals Board correctly ordered that this 
balance be used to offset CNA's future obligations to the 
Esquivels. 
The Esquivels claim that CNA is not entitled to any offset. 
But there is undeniably a "balance" from the tort action, and that 
balance must be used as a setoff against CNA's future obligations. 
Denying CNA its offset would violate both the plain language and 
the intent of the governing statute, as doing so would reverse the 
priorities recognized by the statute and would give the Esquivels 
a double recovery. In fact, the resolution proposed by the 
Esquivels would actually negate the statute entirely. 
The Esquivels propose a formula for the allocation of the tort 
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proceeds, but this formula is plagued by several problems. First, 
its results are inconsistent with Utah law, and as such the formula 
cannot be adopted. The formula's application in the instant case 
flies in the face of the governing statute. Moreover, the formula 
is inherently invalid, as by definition the formula violates the 
statute's requirement that the fees and costs be charged "propor-
tionately against the parties as their interests may appear." The 
formula suffers from inherent analytical defects as well, as it is 
based on inaccurate assumptions and internally contradictory 
premises. 
The Esquivels assert that the governing statute is "unfair" 
because it gives the insurer priority over the employee in the 
distribution of the tort proceeds while the employee brings the 
tort action. But the statute must be applied as written, even if 
the Esquivels do not like it. Moreover, when looked at in the 
context of the entire workers' compensation scheme, giving the 
insurer priority is not unfair, as the insurer guarantees 
compensation to all injured employees, regardless of fault. The 
insurer is required to pay compensation even if the accident is 
entirely the fault of the employee or of third persons, but in 
exchange the insurer receives priority in the distribution of the 
tort proceeds. In addition, the Esquivels' attorneys could have 
alleviated a great deal of the risk if they had informed CNA they 
were bringing the action, as the statute clearly requires them to 
do. Finally, the risks faced by the Esquivels -- bringing a tort 
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action and ending up with no net benefit -- are really no different 
from the risks faced by the plaintiff in every civil action. 
The Esquivels also object to the Commission's use of 
discounting in determining the length of the offset CNA will 
receive because of the tort recovery. But the Esquivels did not 
object to this when it was raised before the Commission, so they 
are precluded from complaining now. Moreover, discounting is 
required under the Commission's own regulations, and it certainly 
cannot be said that the Commission abused its discretion in 
ordering it. Finally, even if there were no regulation, the 
Commission's use of discounting is a reasonable application of the 
governing statute and is entitled to substantial deference under 
UAPA. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE LABOR COMMISSION APPEALS BOARD PROPERLY HELD THAT THE 
BALANCE OF THE PROCEEDS FROM THE THIRD PARTY TORT ACTION MUST 
BE APPLIED TO REDUCE CNA'S FUTURE WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
LIABILITY TO THE ESQUIVELS. 
A. The governing statute plainly requires that any balance 
remaining after fees, costs, and reimbursement must be 
used to "reduce or satisfy in full" the workers' 
compensation insurer's future liability to the employee 
or his or her dependents. 
CNA's argument is really very simple: Under the plain 
language of the Workers' Compensation Act, any balance remaining 
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from a third-party tort action must be used to offset the insurer's 
future liability to the injured worker (or his dependents). And 
after the costs and fees of the Esquivels' third-party tort action 
were paid, there was a balance of $68,507.97. Therefore, this 
balance must be used to offset CNA's future obligations to the 
Esquivels. The Commission's order was therefore correct. 
Distribution of the proceeds of a third-party tort action is 
presently governed by Utah Code Ann § 34A-2-106(5), which provides 
as follows: 
(5) If any recovery is obtained against a third person, 
it shall be disbursed as follows: 
(a) The reasonable expense of the action, including 
attorneys' fees, shall be paid and charged proportion-
ately against the parties as their interests may appear. 
Any fee chargeable to the employer or carrier is to be a 
credit upon any fee payable by the injured employee or, 
in the case of death, by the dependents, for any recovery 
had against the third party. 
(b) The person liable for compensation payments 
shall be reimbursed, less the proportionate share of 
costs and attorneys' fees provided for in Subsection 
(5)(a), for the payments made as follows: 
(c) The balance shall be paid to the injured 
employee or his heirs in case of death, to be applied to 
reduce or satisfy in full any obligation thereafter 
accruing against the person liable for compensation. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106(5) (1997 repl. vol.).2 
2CNA quotes the present version of the statute here for ease 
of discussion. However, "in workers' compensation claims, the law 
existing at the time of the injury applies in relation to that 
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Thus, under subsection (5) (a) , the proceeds of an action 
against a third party must first be used to pay the reasonable 
expenses of the action. Next, under subsection (5) (b) , the 
workers' compensation insurer must be reimbursed, less its share of 
fees and costs. Then under subsection (5)(c), the balance goes to 
the employee or dependents, jbut the insurer is entitled to an 
offset against future payments. 
The Labor Commission's order distributed the proceeds from the 
tort action against Gravely International exactly as directed by 
the statute. The recovery from the action was $203,507.25. Under 
paragraph (a), the attorney fees and costs ($134,999.28) were paid 
out of this amount. CNA has waived any right to reimbursement, so 
paragraph (b) did not apply. Thus, at this point, $68,507.97 
remained. Under the plain language of the statute, this was 
clearly the "balance." So under paragraph (c) , the Commission 
ordered that this amount be paid to the Esquivels and be "applied 
injury." Brown & Root Indus, v. Indus. Comm'n, 947 P.2d 671, 675 
(Utah 1997). At the time of the accident, CNA's right to 
reimbursement and offset was guaranteed by former Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-1-62, which did NOT contain any provision for reducing the 
employer's or insurer's reimbursement by the percentage of fault 
attributable to the employer. See Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-62 (1988 
repl. vol.) (Addendum Exhibit 5) . The provision limiting the right 
to reimbursement did not go into effect until May 2, 1994. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106, Amendment Notes. 
CNA has waived any right to reimbursement, however, contingent 
on receiving a full offset. Motion for Review, R. 176 n.3 
(Addendum Exhibit 3). So the 1994 amendment to the statute should 
not come into play. 
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to reduce . . . any obligation thereafter accruing against the 
person liable for compensation." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106(5)(c). 
Of course, the attorney fees and other litigation expenses had 
to be "charged proportionately against the parties as their inter-
ests may appear." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106(5)(a). And as the 
Esquivels have pointed out in their brief, because there was not 
enough money left over to fully satisfy CNA's future liabilities, 
CNA's "interest" in the tort proceeds was one hundred percent, and 
it must be charged the entire amount of the fees and costs. But as 
the statute plainly provides, this amount can only be charged out 
of the gross judgment. 
The statute provides that fees and costs must be paid out of 
the "recovery," so as a matter of basic logic the "recovery" can 
only be the amount available before fees and costs are subtracted. 
Thus, although the entire amount of the fees and expenses must be 
charged to CNA, they can only be taken out of the $203,507 
"recovery." Consequently, the "balance" is still $68,507.97, as 
noted above. And it was this "balance" that was used to offset 
CNA's future liability to the Esquivels. The Commission's Order is 
therefore perfectly in accordance with the governing statute. 
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B. Denying CNA its setoff would violate both the plain 
language and the intent of the governing statute. 
Despite the plain language of the statute, the Esquivels claim 
that CNA is not entitled to any setoff at all. But whatever 
"formula" may be proposed, whatever assumptions may be made, and 
whatever reasoning may be used, the bottom line is that once the 
dust settles, there is clearly a "balance" remaining from the 
third-party tort action, and the law unambiguously requires that 
this balance be used to offset CNA's future liability to the 
Esquivels. 
Denying CNA its offset would violate both the language and the 
purpose of section 34A-2-106(5) . As set forth in the previous sec-
tion, the statute provides that money recovered in a tort action 
must be distributed in the following order: expenses, reimburse-
ment, and offset. Anything left over is then distributed to the 
employee or dependents free and clear. So the statute plainly 
gives the insurer priority over the employee and his dependents: 
"It is elementary that the claimant should not be allowed to keep 
the entire amount both of his compensation award and of his common-
law damage recovery. The obvious disposition of the matter is to 
give the employer so much of the negligence recovery as is 
necessary to reimburse him for his compensation outlay, and to give 
the employee the excess.1' Taylor v. Indus. Comm'n, 743 P.2d 1183, 
1186 (Utah 1987) (emphasis added) (quoting Shields v. Wveth 
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Laboratories, 513 P.2d 404, 405-06 (Idaho 1973)).3 
The Esquivels, on the other hand, propose to turn this process 
upside down by giving the employee first crack at the tort pro-
ceeds. They essentially argue that because there is not enough 
money to go around, they keep it all -- with no offset. This flies 
in the face of section 34A-2-106(5). Indeed, the Esquivels appear 
to be arguing that it is because the statute gives CNA priority 
that CNA ends up with nothing: CNA has the primary "interest," so 
it gets charged with all the expenses, which leaves CNA with no 
reimbursement and no offset. In other words, CNA has all the 
interest, so it ends up with none of the benefits of the tort, 
action, and because the Esquivels presumably have no interest, they 
end up with all of the benefits! This simply cannot be. 
Moreover, ruling in favor of the Esquivels would frustrate one 
of the key purposes of the statute, which is to prevent an employee 
or his dependents from recovering twice for the same injury. 
Allstate v. Bliss, 725 P.2d 1330, 1334 (Utah 1986). In our case 
3The Commission was therefore completely correct when it 
stated that the insurer had the "first right of reimbursement" and 
that CNA's interest "takes precedence over the claimants' 
interest." And nothing in Worthen changes this. Worthen v. 
Shurtleff & Andrews, Inc., 426 P.2d 223 (Utah 1967) . While Worthen 
held that the insurer had to pay its share of the litigation 
expenses, it actually confirmed the insurer's priority over the 
employee. Worthen explained that the allocation of proceeds had to 
follow the order set forth in the statute, so immediately after the 
fees and costs are paid, "the reimbursement to the insurer is made 
from the funds remaining." Id. at 226. 
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there are two pools of money: the tort proceeds and the workers' 
compensation benefits. The purpose of each of these funds is to 
compensate the Esquivels for the accident. But the Esquivels are 
asking this court to award them every dollar of the tort proceeds 
and every dollar of the workers' compensation benefits. This is 
precisely what the statute was intended to prevent. 
Indeed, such a ruling would effectively eliminate the statute 
entirely. Picture what would happen if section 34A-2-106(5) did 
not even exist. If there were no provision for an insurer or 
employer to take part in any third-party tort recovery, then the 
employee would recover all of the tort proceeds and still be 
entitled to receive full workers' compensation benefits. This is 
exactly what the Esquivels are proposing. 
C. The Esquivels' proposed "formula" cannot be adopted. 
Instead of simply acknowledging the plain language of the 
governing statute, the Esquivels ask this court to adopt a formula 
to determine how the proceeds of a tort action should be dis-
tributed. Of course, the statute already directs how the proceeds 
are to be distributed, so no formula is necessary. But the 
proposed formula also leads to results that violate the Utah 
statute. And the formula itself is invalid because it is based on 
assumptions lacking any basis in reality or logic. CNA therefore 
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requests that this court reject the proposed formula and instead 
apply the statute according to its plain language. 
1. The proposed formula leads to absurd results 
and is inconsistent with Utah law. 
First, the Esquivels' proposed formula leads to improper 
results. For example, in the instant case, the formula leads to an 
outcome that flatly violates the law. As demonstrated above, the 
governing statute clearly grants the insurer priority over the 
employee in the distribution of the proceeds, but using the formula 
would result in CNA receiving nothing while the Esquivels receive 
$68,507.97 free and clear. Moreover, the statute plainly requires 
that any "balance" be used to offset the insurer's future 
liabilities, but the formula results in no offset, even though 
there is obviously a balance. Finally, the statute requires 
expenses to be charged "proportionately," but use of the formula in 
this case results in CNA being charged 100% of the expenses and 
receiving 0% of the benefit, while the Esquivels pay 0% of the 
expenses and receive 100% of the benefit. 
The Esquivels contend that their "formula" is proper, it's 
just the result that happens to be unusual. This is nonsense. If 
the application of a formula clearly violates the statute, the 
formula simply cannot be valid. Indeed, the Esquivels' own 
examples provide additional evidence that their formula is invalid. 
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For example, the Esquivels' "Example No. 3" (Petitioners' Addendum 
Exhibit 5) shows that if the verdict in the third-party action had 
been over eight hundred thousand dollars, CNA would have received 
only eighteen thousand dollars in reimbursement or offset. To 
suggest that such a huge judgment would not be enough to take care 
of a $20,000 reimbursement is patently absurd. In fact, under the 
Esquivels' formula, even a fifty million dollar judgment would give 
CNA a setoff of only $48,857, less than one-third of its lien.4 
The Esquivels' formula cannot be used in Utah because it does 
not result in litigation expenses being charged "proportionately" 
against the parties as their interests may appear. Our case is not 
an aberration, either; in fact, the Esquivels' proposed formula can 
never result in fees and costs being charged proportionately. In 
Worthen v. Shurtleff & Andrews, Inc., 426 P.2d 223 (Utah 1967), the 
attorney fee was one-fourth of the judgment, so the Utah Supreme 
Court held that the carrier must be charged one-fourth of its lien 
as its proportionate share of the fees. And in Prettyman v. Utah 
State Dep't of Finance, 496 P.2d 89 (Utah 1972), the attorney fee 
was one-third of the settlement amount, and the insurer was ordered 
4If the gross judgment were $50,000,000, the total expenses of 
litigation would be $20,053,596 (forty percent attorney fee of 
$20,000,000, plus costs of $53,596). Thus, the net judgment would 
be $2 9,94 6,4 04. CNA's "proportionate share" of the expenses would 
thus be 0.494% (147,922 / 29,946,404). Multiplying this percentage 
by the total expenses shows that CNA's actual share of the expenses 
would be $99,065. Subtracting this amount from CNA's lien leads to 
a reimbursement/offset of $48,857. 
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charged one-third of its lien as its share of the fees. These are 
both instances of "proportionate" allocation. But under the 
Esquivels' formula, if the contingent fee is one-third, the insurer 
will always be charged at least one-half of its lien -- and a much 
higher percentage if the costs are significant! (A mathematical 
analysis of the Esquivels' proposed formula is provided at Addendum 
Exhibit 6.) And if the contingent fee is forty percent, the 
insurer would always be charged at least two-thirds of its lien as 
its so-called "proportionate" share of expenses. 
For these reasons, the court cannot rely on Breen v. Caesar's 
Palace, 715 P.2d 1070 (Nev. 1986) . The formula used in Breen 
appears to be identical to the one proposed by the Esquivels on 
this appeal. But Breen cannot be followed in Utah, because the 
statute in Nevada is significantly different from the statute 
governing in Utah. Most importantly, the Nevada statute does not 
require that the fees be charged "proportionately"! See former 
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 616.560 (quoted in Breen, 715 P.2d at 1071 n.l) . 
A case applying a completely different statute will not have any 
persuasive value in Utah. And, as shown above, use of the formula 
guarantees that the expenses will not be charged proportionately. 
In fact, the hypothetical presented in Breen would result in 
the insurer paying fees at a rate over twenty times higher than 
that charged the employee's dependents. In the Breen hypothetical, 
the insurer is charged $325,000 in attorney fees to satisfy a lien 
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of $650,000. Thus, the insurer ends up paying half of its lien in 
expenses (even though the litigation expenses were only one-third 
of the judgment) . And the employee's family nets $341,666 from the 
tort action,5 but is charged only $8,333 in fees: a rate of 2.4%. 
If the insurer pays a relative fee of 50% and the worker a fee of 
only 2.4%, the fees are not being charged "proportionately." Breen 
thus cannot be followed in Utah; instead, this court must follow 
cases such as Worthen and Prettyman, which require that the fees 
charged to the insurer must be directly proportionate to the 
benefit the insurer receives from the tort action. 
2. The proposed formula suffers from significant 
analytical defects. 
The Esquivels' proposed formula suffers from some major 
foundational flaws. The most important problem is that after the 
carrier's share of expenses is calculated, that amount is then 
subtracted from the net judgment in determining the amount of the 
carrier's offset. But both the statute and simple logic provide 
that fees and costs can only be charged against a gross judgment. 
5In the hypothetical discussed in Breen, the worker's family 
ends up with a total of $991,666 in compensation payments and tort 
recovery: $666,666 from the tort action, and the remaining 
$325,000 in workers' compensation benefits (because Caesar's 
received a net offset of $325,000). Without the tort action, the 
family would have received a total of $650,000, so the worker's 
family receives a net benefit from the tort action of $341,666. 
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First, as a matter of plain English, the "gross" judgment is 
the amount of the judgment before fees and costs have been 
subtracted. And the "net" judgment is the amount remaining after 
those expenses have been subtracted. Simply put, charging the fees 
and costs against the gross judgment is the only approach that 
could possibly make any sense. Also, as noted above, the statute 
itself requires that the fees and costs be charged out of the 
"recovery" -- which obviously includes the expenses. CNA was 
already charged once for the fees and costs when the $203,507 
judgment was reduced to $68,507. It would be illogical and unfair 
to charge CNA with those same expenses a second time. 
Finally, the expenses must be charged against the gross 
judgment because that is how they were actually paid. No money 
came out of either party's pockets, so the only way to conclude 
that any expenses were actually "paid" would be to compare the net 
proceeds to the amounts that would have been received in the 
absence of those expenses -- that is, the gross judgment. So when 
we talk about expenses that CNA should be charged, these amounts 
can only be based on the gross judgment. Therefore, because CNA 
receives all of the benefit of the tort proceeds, it pays all the 
expenses. But those expenses must be taken out of the gross 
recovery. 
The Esquivels appear to base their approach on the unsupported 
assumption that they have already paid the expenses, so they must 
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be reimbursed by CNA. But it is simply a fallacy to say that the 
Esquivels "paid" the attorney fees and costs. Again, nothing came 
out of the Esquivels' pockets; rather, the fees and costs were paid 
out of the judgment.6 Thus, there would be no basis to require CNA 
to "reimburse" the Esquivels for the expenses of the litigation. 
The Esquivels may contend that the fees and costs were taken 
out of "their" judgment, but this, too, would be false. For as the 
governing statute clearly provides, the judgment never really 
belonged entirely to the Esquivels. Instead, because CNA's 
reimbursement and offset interests take priority over the Esqui-
vels' remainder interest, the money received was to be used first 
to reimburse CNA, and second to offset CNA's future liability. So 
the money used to "pay" the expenses was actually supposed to go to 
CNA, either directly or as an offset. Therefore, if the attorney 
fees and costs were paid by anyone, they were actually paid by CNA. 
Similarly, the Esquivels cannot contend that because they were 
originally nominally liable for the costs and fees, they must have 
"paid" those expenses. As the statute provides, any expenses 
"chargeable" to the insurer are a "credit upon any fee payable by 
the injured employee." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106(5)(a). Thus, 
because all of the expenses are "chargeable" to CNA, the Esquivels 
6Also, the contention that the Esquivels paid the fees and 
costs contradicts the Esquivels' position that the fees and costs 
were not part of the "pie." Obviously, if the expenses were not 
part of the pie, they could not have been paid by the Esquivels. 
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receive a credit against any expenses "payable" by them. And 
because all of the expenses are chargeable under the statute to 
CNA, the Esquivels were entirely relieved of their liability for 
the fees and costs. 
If CNA had brought the third-party action itself, it undoubt-
edly would have been entitled to an offset against its future 
obligations. But 34A-2-106(5) applies the same regardless of which 
party actually files the tort action. Subsection (1) (b) authorizes 
the employee or his dependents to bring a third-party tort action. 
Subsection (2) allows the insurer or employer to do the same. Then 
subsection (5) applies "if any recovery is obtained against a third 
person." Subsection (5) therefore has the same effect whether the 
tort action is brought by the employee or the insurer. 
So if CNA had brought the action on its own, it would have 
been charged the entire amount of expenses. That is, it would have 
been responsible for paying all $53,596.38 in costs and all 
$81,402.90 in attorney fees. But these expenses would have been 
paid out of CNA's gross recovery. And the $68,507.97 left over 
would have been distributed according to subsection (5) : CNA would 
have been reimbursed for its previous compensation payments and the 
rest would have been paid to the Esquivels and used to reduce CNA's 
future obligations. Under section 34A-2-106(5), the same result 
obtains when it is the Esquivels who brought the tort action. 
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D. The Commission's order did not fail to charge CNA with 
any litigation expenses. 
CNA did not somehow escape being charged with the expenses of 
the tort litigation. Instead, as discussed above, CNA was charged 
with all of the litigation expenses. CNA ends up with a net 
benefit, of course, but this is simply because there was a positive 
"balance" from the action, and because the statute gives CNA 
priority. If CNA had not been charged expenses, CNA would have 
received the benefit of the $203,507 gross judgment, which would 
have been enough to fully reimburse CNA for the $21,32 0 in 
compensation payments it had already made and to fully relieve CNA 
of all future obligations. But under the Commission's order, CNA 
was not reimbursed for prior payments, and CNA must resume 
compensation payments on January 23, 2005, and pay them as long as 
required under the Workers' Compensation Act. And CNA may end up 
making payments well into the future, because the deceased 
employee's widow or children may attempt to claim dependency 
benefits even after the youngest child turns eighteen. 
The Esquivels and their attorneys are essentially trying to 
perform the same verbal sleight-of-hand before this court that they 
successfully pulled on the ALJ. By distracting the court with the 
discussion of their "formula," they are attempting to make sixty-
eight thousand dollars disappear. But this will not work. The 
simple, undeniable truth is that there is a "balance" of $68,507.97 
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left over from the proceeds of the third-party tort action, and no 
matter what the Esquivels or their attorneys argue, this money is 
supposed to be used as an offset. 
E. The governing statute must be applied as written. 
The Esquivels raise various complaints as to the way the stat-
ute operates. Most significantly, the Esquivels complain that the 
statute results in their taking a risk, with CNA getting the 
benefit. But there are several responses to this contention. 
First, of course, the statute must be applied as written, not as 
the Esquivels wish it were written. Second, the reason the 
Esquivels ended up taking all the financial risk is because of 
their own attorneys1 failure to follow the clear requirements of 
the law and notify CNA of the action. Third, the risks faced by 
the Esquivels -- that they may not end up recovering anything from 
their tort action -- are no different from the risks faced by any 
plaintiff. Fourth, there is no "unfairness" when the statute is 
looked at in light of the entire Workers' Compensation Act. 
Subsection (5) (c) is unambiguous and must therefore be applied 
in accordance with its plain language. "Only when we find 
ambiguity in the statute's plain language need we seek guidance 
from the legislative history and relevant policy consideration." 
City of South Salt Lake v. Salt Lake County, 925 P.2d 954, 957 
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(Utah 1996) (quoting Gohler v. Wood, 919 P.2d 561, 562-63 (Utah 
1996)). In our case, the statute could not be any clearer. It 
provides three steps in the distribution of a third-party tort 
recovery: first the expenses are paid, then the reimbursement is 
made, and finally, the "balance" is paid to the injured employee or 
his dependents, "to be applied to reduce or satisfy in full" the 
insurer's remaining obligations. There is absolutely no ambiguity 
in any of these provisions. 
Additionally, the Esquivels' financial risks could have been 
greatly alleviated if their attorneys had simply obeyed the statute 
and told CNA they were proceeding with the action. Subsection 34A-
2-106(3) (a) requires that an injured employee or his or her 
dependents planning a third-party tort action must provide the 
carrier with "written notice of the intention to bring an action 
against the third party." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106(3)(a) (1997 
repl. vol.). Moreover, the statute explicitly requires that this 
notice be given before the action is commenced, so the carrier will 
have a reasonable opportunity to enter an appearance in the action. 
Id. And it is undisputed that the Esquivels' tort attorneys did 
not give CNA written notice of their intention to file this third-
party action. See R. 163. In fact, the only reason CNA even 
learned about the tort action was because CNA's investigator was 
deposed by the defendants in the tort action. 
Normally, when an injured worker plans to bring a third-party 
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action, his or her attorneys comply with this statute and notify 
the carrier. And if the carrier thinks that the action has any 
chance, the carrier will agree to be partially or even wholly 
liable for the costs of the action. At the time this third-party 
action was brought, CNA still had a substantial future liability to 
the Esquivels, so if the Esquivels' attorneys had simply notified 
CNA of their intent to pursue the action, CNA would undoubtedly 
have agreed to contribute to the costs. The Esquivels therefore 
would not have taken a disproportionate financial risk. If the 
Esquivels have a complaint about the financial risks they took, 
they should be complaining to their own attorneys. 
Moreover, the risks faced by the Esquivels in their third-
party action are really no different from the risks faced by every 
plaintiff. That is, the plaintiff in every lawsuit bears a risk 
that he or she will not recover anything or that the expenses of 
the action will be greater than the ultimate recovery. This risk 
is not unique to a workers' compensation third-party tort action. 
It is true that a plaintiff in a third-party action under section 
34A-2-106 has a higher break-even point than a plaintiff in a 
"normal" tort action, but this is simply a consequence of the fact 
that the plaintiff has already received compensation for his 
injuries! The remedy for the problem identified by the Esquivels 
is not to ignore the statute, but rather for the plaintiff's 
attorney to properly advise his or her client, so that a plaintiff 
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only pursues the action if there is a reasonable chance of a 
sufficient recovery after the liens have been satisfied.7 Indeed, 
the Esquivels even appear to acknowledge that this is what should 
have been done. Petitioners' Brief at 38. 
Further, it must be remembered that section 34A-2-106(5) is 
just one small part of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, which 
itself is a system of tradeoffs. Under the fundamental compen-
sation principle, the employee gives up the right to sue the 
employer for negligence, but in exchange the employer is required 
to pay compensation for any injury that arises out of the 
employment, regardless of fault. In some situations, the workers' 
compensation system results in the employee or his family receiving 
less than they would have under the common-law tort system. But 
the employee always receives compensation, and in the overwhelming 
majority of cases the employee receives compensation where none 
would be available under the tort system. 
In other words, under the workers' compensation scheme the 
employer or insurer becomes a guarantor of every employee's income. 
If an employee is hurt on the job, that employee receives compen-
sation. And the employer's liability to the employee cannot 
7This case is thus similar to the situation where a personal 
injury plaintiff has large hospital bills. Under Chapter 7 of 
Title 38 of the Utah Code, the hospital is entitled to a lien on 
any judgment obtained by such a plaintiff. Thus it is not uncommon 
for a plaintiff to obtain a rather large "judgment" but no 
recovery. 
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reduced by any fault attributable to the employee himself or to a 
third party. In fact, even if a jury later finds that the employer 
was completely free of fault, the employer still pays, and at the 
full rate. But in exchange for this guarantee, subsection 34A-2-
106(5) gives the employer or insurer priority in the disbursement 
of the proceeds of a third-party tort action. Again, in some 
situations this overall tradeoff benefits the employee, and in 
others, it benefits the employer. It is up to the legislature to 
determine where to strike the balance, and the legislature has 
clearly spoken. Any objections to the statute should therefore be 
addressed to the legislature. 
Finally, CNA takes exception to the accusation that it is 
being "oppressive" to widows and orphans. As discussed in the 
previous paragraph, the Workers' Compensation Act clearly gives CNA 
a priority right to the proceeds, in exchange for CNA's guarantee 
of income to the Esquivels regardless of fault. Even if the jury 
had found that the accident was entirely Mr. Esquivel's fault, or 
that no one was negligent, the Esquivels still were guaranteed full 
workers' compensation benefits for at least fourteen years. And 
just for the record, when the Esquivels settled their original 
third-party action for $375,000, CNA could have insisted on a full 
offset against any future compensation liability. There was more 
than enough money left over after expenses to offset CNA's obliga-
tions for many years. But CNA instead voluntarily agreed to settle 
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its lien at that point for only a forty percent offset against 
future compensation payments. In fact, the only reason CNA even 
has a claim to the proceeds of the Gravely action is because CNA 
let the Esquivels keep the bulk of the original action free and 
clear. 
It is unfortunate that the Esquivels went through a lot of 
effort for no net gain. But in this respect they are no different 
from any other unsuccessful plaintiffs. As noted above, the remedy 
for this problem is for attorneys to properly advise their clients 
as to the clear requirements of the law. Section 34A-2-106(5) 
explicitly gives CNA a right to an offset for the balance recovered 
in the action, and that statute simply must be applied in 
accordance with its plain language. The Commission's order 
providing for the offset was therefore correct and must be 
affirmed. 
II. THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE COMMISSION'S RULING THAT CNA'S 
FUTURE PAYMENTS MUST BE DISCOUNTED TO THEIR PRESENT VALUE IN 
DETERMINING THE LENGTH OF CNA'S OFFSET. 
A. The Esquivels are precluded from raising this issue on 
appeal because they failed to raise it below. 
First, the Esquivels have waived their right to challenge the 
Commission's order regarding discounting, because they chose not to 
oppose CNA's request for discounting below. It is a basic prin-
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ciple of administrative law that "issues not raised in proceedings 
before administrative agencies are not subject to judicial review 
except in exceptional circumstances." Brown & Root v. Indus. 
Comm'n, 947 P.2d 671, 677 (Utah 1997). When CNA filed its motion 
for review with the Commission, it pointed out that its future 
obligations had to be discounted in determining the duration of the 
offset. Motion for Review, R. 180-83 (Addendum Exhibit 3) . And in 
their response to the motion, the Esquivels did not oppose this 
request. Response to Motion for Review, R. 191-204 (Addendum 
Exhibit 4) . The Esquivels had the opportunity to present to the 
Commission their reasons why the Commission should not or could not 
apply discounting, but they chose not to. They cannot now claim 
that the Commission erred in ordering discounting. See, e.g. Alvin 
G. Rhodes Pump Sales v. Indus. Comm'n, 681 P.2d 1244, 1249 (Utah 
1984) (where Second Injury Fund failed to raise issue in its 
opposition to a motion for review, it was precluded from raising 
that issue on appeal). 
B- The Commission's order requiring discounting was a proper 
application of the Commission's own regulations. 
In the alternative, even if the court chooses to address the 
merits, the portion of the order requiring discounting is certainly 
within the Commission's discretion and should be affirmed. The 
Esquivels received the judgment for $68,507.97 on April 9, 1996, to 
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be applied to satisfy CNA's obligation to make future payments. At 
that time, CNA was obligated to pay $205 per week at least until at 
least January 5, 2008. But under basic principles of accounting, 
a $2 05 payment made on say, January 1, 1998, is worth substantially 
more than $2 05 due to be paid on January 1, 2 008.8 Therefore, in 
determining the number of weekly payments represented by the 
$68,507.97 recovered in 1996, the amount of each future weekly 
payment must be discounted to reflect this difference. 
Discounting is required under the Commission's regulations. 
These regulations provide that when a lump sum payment is made to 
satisfy future weekly obligations, the future payments shall be 
discounted using a rate of eight percent. At all times relevant to 
this action, Rule R568-1-11 provided that 
Eight percent shall be used for any discounting or 
present value calculations. Lump sums ordered by the 
Commission of any permanent partial benefit award as per 
Section 35-1-79, U.C.A., or for any attorney fees paid in 
a single up-front amount instead of across the length of 
an award up to 312 week maximum allowed by Rule R568-1-7, 
or of any other sum being paid earlier than normally paid 
under a weekly benefit method shall be subject to the 8% 
discounting. . . . For those instances where discount 
calculations are not routinely utilized or where the 
Commission's table is not available, the following table, 
which is a shortened version of the precise table, may be 
utilized by interpolating between the stated weeks and 
the related discount. 
Utah Admin. Code R568-1-11 (repealed) (emphasis added).9 In our 
8At the eight percent discount rate provided by Rule R568-1-
11, a $205 payment due in ten years is worth $94.96 today. 
industrial Commission Rule R568-1-11 has been replaced by 
Labor Commission Rule R612-1-4, which is very similar in substance. 
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case, the Esquivels received a lump sum of $68,507.97. This was 
obviously a sum "being paid earlier than normally paid under a 
weekly benefit method." Therefore R568-1-11 applies, and each 
future payment must be discounted to its present value to determine 
how much that payment is "worth" today. Each discounted future 
weekly payment should then be subtracted from the balance until the 
$68,507.97 is exhausted. CNA must be given credit for that number 
of future payments, and it should resume paying $205 per week after 
that number of weeks has expired. 
The Commission's interpretation of its own regulations is 
entitled to significant deference under UAPA. For even if the 
Commission has departed from its own regulation, its decision to do 
so will be upheld unless the Commission has abused its discretion. 
"Because courts should uphold agency rules if they are reasonable 
and rational, courts should also uphold reasonable and rational 
departures from those rules absent a showing that the departure 
violated some other right." Union Pacific R. v. Auditing Div., 842 
P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1992). 
The purpose of R568-1-11 is obviously to recognize the basic 
accounting principles discussed above. And even if the instant 
situation does not fall within the strict language of R568-1-11, 
there is nothing in the rule to suggest that the three examples 
provided there are the only situations in which discounting could 
be applied. Cf. Willardson v. Indus. Comm'n, 904 P.2d 671, 674 
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(Utah 1995) (three examples set forth in regulation regarding 
referral to medical panel were deemed to be illustrative, not 
exhaustive, and referral to panel was required in a situation not 
listed in the regulation). Indeed, the regulation's reference to 
situations where discounts are "not routinely utilized" recognizes 
that other situations will arise where discounting will be 
appropriate. At any rate, the principles behind R568-1-11 
certainly have nothing to do with the source of the lump sum 
payment. Thus it was perfectly reasonable for the Commission to 
apply R568-1-11 in our case. 
C. Even without the regulation, the Commission's use of 
discounting was a reasonable application of the governing 
statute. 
Finally, even if there were no regulation requiring discount-
ing, the order would be proper as a reasonable application of 
section 34A-2-106(5). The Legislature has granted the Labor Com-
mission the "duty and the full power, jurisdiction, and authority 
to determine the facts and apply the law in this chapter or any 
other title or chapter it admininsters." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-
301 (1997 repl. vol.). In Caporoz v. Labor Commission, 945 P.2d 
141 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), and Osman Home Improvement v. Industrial 
Commission, 342 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (Ct. App. April 30, 1998), this 
court explained that an identical grant of discretion to the 
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Industrial Commission required that the Commission's application of 
the law be reviewed under an "abuse of discretion" standard. 
Therefore, the Labor Commission's application of the law must be 
affirmed unless the decision "exceeded the bounds of reasonableness 
and rationality." Osman, 342 Utah Adv. Rep. at 8 (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
There is no way the Commission exceeded the bounds of reason-
ableness when it ordered that future payments be discounted to 
their present value in determining the length of CNA's offset. As 
stated above, discounting is not a new, radical concept. In fact, 
Utah juries are instructed to apply discounting in calculating 
future damage awards in civil cases. MUJI 27.11. And it was over 
eighty years ago that the United States Supreme Court held that 
discounting must be applied in calculating damages awarded under 
the Federal Employer's' Liability Act, even though the Act did not 
expressly provide for discounting. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. 
Kelly, 241 U.S. 485 (1916). The Court in Kelly recognized that 
"[i]t is self-evident that a given sum of money in hand is worth 
more than the like sum of money payable in the future." Id. at 
489. The Commission's order, and the regulation on which the order 
was based, likewise recognize this basic concept. 
Indeed, it would have been error for the Commission not to 
apply discounting, as the Utah Supreme Court has held that dis-
counting must be used when a lump sum payment is made in lieu of 
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weekly compensation benefits, even in the absence of a statute or 
regulation. In State Insurance Fund v. Renakf 621 P.2d 714 (Utah 
1980) , the employee petitioned the Commission for an advance lump-
sum payment of weekly permanent partial disability benefits. The 
court held that the Commission erred in refusing to apply 
discounting in granting the petition: 
In ordering the lump-sum award, it is obvious that the 
$12,000 in hand is more valuable to the defendant Renak 
than that same total sum would be if paid to him in 
weekly payments, and, conversely, that such requirement 
places a greater financial burden upon the plaintiff. It 
is our opinion that this was not the intent of Sec. 35-1-
79, but that when a lump sum payment in advance is or-
dered, there should be a reasonable and proper reduction 
on an actuarial basis so that the amount to be paid by 
the obligor will be equal to the present value of the 
extended payments. 
Id. at 715 (emphasis added). 
The reasoning of Renak applies here. The $68,507.97 received 
by the Esquivels is certainly worth more "in hand" than it would 
have been if spread over the next six years. And failing to dis-
count would require CNA to pay more than it is obligated to under 
the law. When the Esquivels received their tort award, the present 
value of CNA's future obligations (through January 5, 2 008) to the 
Esquivels was approximately $83,000. Order, Addendum Exhibit 1, 
R. 264. CNA is entitled to a $68,507.97 offset against this 
amount. Thus, the present value of CNA's remaining obligations 
should be around $14,492. But if the future payments are not 
discounted to their present value, CNA will end up paying more than 
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this. Thus, CNA will have been denied the full effect of its 
offset. 
If CNA and the Esquivels decided to enter into a lump sum 
agreement to take care of CNA's entire expected liability, the 
regulation is clear that the eight percent discount rate would be 
used to determine how much CNA would have to pay to satisfy its 
future obligation. There is no reason why the calculation should 
be any different when the lump sum payment is received as a result 
of a tort action against a third party. Therefore, the Commission 
did not abuse its discretion in ordering that discounting be 
applied in determining the duration of CNA's offset under section 
34A-2-106 (5) . 
CONCLUSION 
Respondents Redd Roofing and Construction Company and CNA 
Insurance Company therefore respectfully request that this court 
affirm the order of the Labor Commission Appeals Board. 
DATED this I (a day of ^ A ^ , 1998. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE 
THEODORE E. KANELL 
STEPHEN P. HORVAT 
Attorneys for Respondents 
-42-
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on this jt day of J*U , 19 
two true and correct copies of the foregoing were hand delivered 
the following: 
Robert B. Sykes 
Matthew H. Raty 
SYKES Sc VILOS 
311 South State Street, #240 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Alan Hennebold 
LABOR COMMISSION OF UTAH 
P.O. Box 146615 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6615 
JJL e. un^/ir 
ADDENDUM 
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Review, January 14, 1998, R. 262-266. 
2. ALJ's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, 
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5. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-62 (1988 repl. vol.). 
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APPEALS BOARD 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
DEPENDANTS OF EDWARD 
ESQUIVEL (Deceased), 
Applicants, 
v. 
REDD ROOFING & COMPANY and 
CNA INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
Redd Roofing & Company and its workers' compensation insurance carrier, CNA Insurance 
Company (referred to collectively as "Redd Roofing" hereafter) ask the Appeals Board of the Utah 
Labor Commission to review the Administrative Law Judge's determination that Redd Roofing is not 
entitled to any offset of its liability for benefits payable to the dependents of Edward Esquivel under 
the Utah Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act".) 
The Appeals Board exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801(3) and Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1.M. 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
May the proceeds of the Esquivel dependents' third party lawsuit be offset against Redd 
Roofing's liability for future dependents' benefits? 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
On April 26,1993, Mr. Esquivel was killed in an accident while working for Redd Roofing. 
At the time of the accident, Mr. Esquivel was using a roof sweeper manufactured by Gravely 
International to clean the roof of a building owned by the Freeport Center. Redd Roofing accepted 
liability for the dependents' benefits payable under the Act to Mr. Esquivel's children and spouse. 
The dependents then commenced a negligence lawsuit against Gravely International.1 
1
 Prior to their lawsuit against Graveley International, the dependents also brought a 
negligence lawsuit against the Freeport Center. The parties have previously agreed to the 
disbursement of the proceeds from the Freeport Center lawsuit. 
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On April 9, 1996, the dependents were awarded damages of $203,507.25 from Gravely 
International. After deduction of attorneys fees and costs of $134,999.28, the dependents' net award 
was $68,507.97. 
Although Redd Roofing has waived its claim to reimbursement for dependents' benefits paid 
prior to April 9, 1996, it continues to assert its right to offset the net amount of the dependent's third 
party award against its liability for future dependents' benefits. As of April 9, 1996, the present value 
of Redd Roofing's liability for such future benefits, computed at a discount rate of 8%, was $83,000. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
Redd Roofing's right of offset against proceeds of the dependents' third party lawsuit is 
governed by §34A-2-106(5) of the Act.2 Section 106(5)(a) provides the method for allocating the 
costs and attorneys fees of the third party lawsuit between the dependents and Redd Roofing. 
Section 106(5)(b) also establishes the formula for reimbursing Redd Roofing for dependents' benefits 
already paid to the dependents. However, Redd Roofing has waived this right to reimbursement. 
Finally, §106(5)(c) governs Redd Roofing's right to offset the dependents' third party award against 
the future dependents' benefits that Red Roofing would otherwise be required to pay. 
2
 The full text of subsection 34A-2-106(5) is as follows: 
(5) If any recovery is obtained against a third person, it shall be disbursed in accordance with 
Subsections (5)(a) through (c). 
(a) The reasonable expense of the action, including attorneys' fees, shall be paid and charged 
proportionately against the parties as their interests may appear. Any fee chargeable to the employer 
or carrier is to be a credit upon any fee payable by the injured employee or, in the case of death, by 
the dependents, for any recovery had against the third party. 
(b) The person liable for compensation payments shall be reimbursed, less the proportionate 
share of costs and attorneys' fees provided for in Subsection (5)(a), for the payments made as follows: 
(i) without reduction based on fault attributed to the employer, officer, agent, or employee 
of the employer in the action against the third party if the combined percentage of fault attributed to 
persons immune from suit is determined to be less than 40% prior to any reallocation of fault under 
Subsection 78-27-39(2); or 
(ii) less the amount of payments made multiplied by the percentage of fault attributed to the 
employer, officer, agent, or employee of the employer in the action against the third party if the 
combined percentage of fault attributed to persons immune from suit is determined to be 40% or 
more prior to any reallocation of fault under Subsection 78-27-39(2). 
(c) The balance shall be paid to the injured employee, or the employee's heirs in case of death, 
to be applied to reduce or satisfy in full any obligation thereafter accruing against the person liable 
for compensation. 
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I. ALLOCATION OF COSTS AND ATTORNEYS FEES 
Section 106(5)(a) requires that attorneys fees and costs incurred in third party lawsuits be 
allocated between the dependents and the employer's workers' compensation insurance carrier "as 
their interests may appear." In this regard, it is important to note that §106(5)(b) and (c) grant the 
first right of reimbursement and offset to the insurance carrier. Because the statute requires that the 
employer's interest in the third party award takes precedence over the claimants' interest, Redd 
Roofing's share must be determined first. The dependents' share will then be limited to the amount 
of the award that remains after Redd Roofing's share has been deducted. The allocation of attorneys' 
fees and costs between the parties must reflect the foregoing division. 
In this case, the amount of the third party judgment actually available for allocation is 
$68,507.97, which represents the amount of the third party judgment after attorneys fees and costs 
have been deducted. The present value of Redd Roofing's liability for future dependents' benefits, 
to be offset by the third party award, is $83,000 Because Redd Roofing's interest in the award is 
more than the net amount of the award itself, Redd Roofing holds the entire interest in the award. 
Consequently, all attorneys fees and costs must be allocated to Redd Roofing. 
II. OFFSET AGAINST FUTURE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFITS 
Because Redd Roofing has waived any right to reimbursement under § 106(5)(b) for 
dependents' benefits already paid, Redd Roofing's only remaining claim is for use of the third party 
award to offset Redd Roofing's future liability for dependents' benefits. This claim to offset is based 
on§106(5)(c): 
The balance shall be paid to the injured employee, or the employee's heirs in case of 
death, to be applied to reduce or satisfy in full any obligation thereafter accruing 
against the person liable for compensation. 
Under the facts of this case, the plain language of §106(5)(c) requires that the balance of the 
dependent's third party award "be applied to reduce" Redd Roofing's liability for dependents' benefits 
"thereafter accruing". In this case, Redd Roofing's future liability consists of weekly payments of 
$205 to the dependents through the year 2008, at least. Consequently, Redd Roofing is entitled to 
use the third party award to offset its obligation to make weekly payments to the dependents, until 
such time as the award has been exhausted. Pursuant to the Utah Labor Commission's Rule R612-1-
4, Redd Roofing may determine the extent of its offset by using an 8% discount rate to computing 
the present value of its future liability. 
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ORDgR 
The Appeals Board reverses the decision of the ALT in this matter and grants Redd Roofing's 
motion for review. The Appeals Board hereby concludes that Redd Roofing may offset the sum of 
$68, 507.97, which is the net amount recovered by the dependents of Mr. Esquivel in their lawsuit 
against Gravely International, against Redd Roofing's future liability for workers' compensation 
benefits otherwise payable to the dependents. After the amount of $68,507.97 has been fUlly offset 
against such future benefits, Redd Roofing must then resume payment of the periodic survivors' 
benefits otherwise provided by the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. It is so ordered. 
Dated this / y d a y of January, 1998. 
^ a 2 ^ -
Colleen Colton, Chair 
i^: 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Appeals Board to reconsider this Order. Any such request for 
reconsideration must be received by the Appeals Board within 20 days of the date of this order. 
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for 
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days of 
the date of this order. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Granting Motion For Review in the matter of 
Dependants of Edward Esquivel, Case No.96-0670 was mailed first class postage prepaid this 
/ T d a y of January, 1998, to the following: 
EDWARD ESQUIVEL, deceased 
(Dependants of) 
2631 F AVENUE 
OGDEN, UTAH 84401 
ROBERT B.SYKES 
JAMES D. VILOS 
MATTHEW H. RATY 
SYKES & VILOS, P.C. 
311 SOUTH STATE STREET #240 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
THEODORE E. KANELL 
STEPHEN P. HORVAT 
HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE, P.C. 
4 TRIAD CENTER SUITE 500 
POST OFFICE BOX 2970 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84110-297-
CNA INSURANCE COMPANY 
4500 CHERRYCREEK DR SOUTH STE 100 
P O BOX 17369 TERMINAL ANNEX 
DENVER COLORADO 80217-0369 
REDD ROOFING COMPANY 
PO BOX 1304 
OGDEN, UTAH 84402 
RICHARD K. NEBEKER 
2040 BENEFICIAL LIFE TOWER 
36 SOUTH STATE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
IJZTIJWT. 
Sara Jensc 
Support Specialist 
Utah Labor Commission 
orders\96-0670 
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OP UTAH 
Case No. 96670 
DEPENDENTS OF EDWARD ESQUIVEL, 
deceased, * 
Petitioner, * 
* 
vs. * 
• 
REDD ROOFING & COMPANY and * 
/or CNA INSURANCE CO., * 
* 
Respondents. * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
BEFORE: The Honorable Benjamin A. Sims, Presiding Law 
Judge. 
On July 10, 1996, the dependents of Edward Esquivel filed an 
Application for Hearing contending that respondents had discontin-
ued workers compensation payments on or about April 1, 1996, and 
that no payments have been made since that time. The payments were 
to have been $205 per week. 
Briefly, the decedent, Edward Esquivel, sustained a fatal 
injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his 
employment with respondent employer on April 26, 1993, at the 
Freeport Center in Clearfield, Utah when he fell off one roof and 
fell through another roof to his death. The Application stated 
that this case involved legal issues only, and that no medical 
issues were involved. The respondents agree. 
At the time of his death, Mr. Esquivel was earning $14.00 per 
hour and was working 40 hours per week. He was married under the 
common law and had four dependent children under the age of 18 at 
the time of his injury, plus a dependent mother. A Compromise 
Settlement of a Disputed Claim was entered into by the dependents 
of the deceased, and Redd Roofing and CNA Insurance Companies on 
March 2, 1994. The Agreement was approved by a administrative law 
judge (law judge) of the Industrial Commission of Utah on March 7, 
1994. The Compromise Settlement of Disputed Claim Order provided 
that: 
1) . . . The applicant shall pay defendants [hereafter 
respondents] the lump sum of $8,263.84. This sum represents 
payment in full of any lien or subrogation owing to CNA for 
death and dependency benefits paid thus far. Respondents 
acknowledge that there is no further claim for offsets, re-
payment, subrogation or the like, on any amounts paid for 
benefits to this point. 
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2) The decedent7s weekly compensation shall hereafter be $205 
per week. This figure is determined by multiplying the 
maximum compensation rate at the time of the accident ($341) 
by sixty percent. This shall be the weekly compensation rate 
for determining all future benefits to which the surviving 
applicants may be entitled, 
3) The [respondents] shall pay all dependency benefits to the 
surviving applicant pursuant to the Utah Code and applicable 
Rules of the Industrial Commission, at the amount set forth in 
paragraph two above, for as long as the applicants are 
entitled to receive those benefits under the law and rules of 
the Commission, 
4) The compensation awarded hereunder shall be paid as 
follows: 
a) to Norma Esquivel, for herself, one-fifth of the 
amount of the benefits of $205 per week, 
b) to Norma Esquivel, for and on behalf of the four 
dependent children, and to be used for their support, the 
sum of one-fifth of the weekly benefits for each child. 
Norma Esquivel shall use those sums for the support of 
the children. 
c) to Ofelia Herrera, the dependent mother, no sum shall 
be paid from these benefits at present because the 
parties have agreed that Ofelia will take a significant 
share of the third party settlement. 
5) Applicants understand that this is a full and final 
settlement. 
6) Applicants understand that in accepting this settlement, 
they are giving up the right to an administrative hearing at 
the Industrial Commission in which an Administrative Law Judge 
could give the applicants more money, less money, or no money. 
7) Applicants' decision to settle this case is their own. No 
one has placed any pressure on the applicants or have 
influenced the applicants in this decision. 
8) No attorneys' fee is claimed or awarded. 
9) It is the applicants desire that the Administrative Law 
Judge approve this settlement. 
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The Order was approved by Theodore Kanell as attorney for Redd 
Roofing and CNA Insurance Company and Robert B. Sykes as attorney 
for the applicants. 
Respondents admit that there are only legal issues to be 
resolved, but deny that the insurance carrier has illegally stopped 
paying benefits due to the personal injury settlement. Specifical-
ly , the insurance carrier alleges that it has stopped making pay-
ments pursuant to the provisions of UCA §35-1-62 (1953 as amended). 
The respondents assert that the petitioners have recovered 
substantial sums of money from third party tort feasors and the 
respondents state that they are relieved from paying further 
benefits as allowed under UCA §35-1-62 (1953 as amended) until the 
petitioners show that they have utilized the third party tort 
recovery money in paying for benefits that would be otherwise 
receivable under the Workers' Compensation Act. 
By way of a separate and affirmative defense, the respondents 
state that the petitioners previously entered into a settlement 
agreement where the petitioners finalized the settlement with the 
third party tort feasor in 1994. This is the same settlement that 
was previously discussed in this Order. Further, the settlement 
agreement was prepared by petitioners and their attorneys. By the 
express language of the settlement agreement, the settlement 
agreement only settled issues up to that point in time. 
Respondents assert that it was their intent that if the petitioners 
recovered money from any third party tort feasors that the 
petitioners would be bound by UCA §35-1-62 (1953 as amended). 
In this case, the petitioners filed a lawsuit against a third 
party tort feasor named Gravely International. Petitioners did not 
tell respondents that they had filed. Petitioners claim that the 
omission was inadvertent and certainly unintentional that the 
respondents were not informed. The case went to trial and 
petitioners recovered a gross amount of $203,507.25. Respondents 
claim that they are entitled to reimbursement of their lien for 
payments since the first settlement and are further entitled to be 
relieved of any further responsibility for future benefits pursuant 
to the statute. Respondents ask that the Industrial Commission 
determine how much of an offset shall be granted and make a further 
determination as to when payments should be resumed, if at all. 
UCA §35-1-62 (3)(a) (1953 as amended) states as follows: 
. . . . Before proceeding against the third party, the injured 
employee, or, in case of death, his heirs, shall give written 
notice of the intention to the carrier and other 
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person obligated for the compensation payments, to give the 
person a reasonable opportunity to enter an appearance in the 
proceeding. 
The settlement agreement previously discussed was filed 
against another set of defendants, Freeport Center Associates, a 
partnership, and Robert 0'Block and Gordon Olch, partners, 
associated in a business in the common name and stock of such 
company, James F. Hannan and John Does I through X, and was filed 
under Civil Number 930900370 PI in the Second Judicial District 
Court of Weber County. This action was ultimately submitted to 
nonbinding arbitration or mediation by retired Judge Collin Y. 
Christensen. After hearing the evidence for several hours, Judge 
Christensen found that the cause of the accident and the 
petitioners death were as follows: Freeport Center - 40% 
negligent; Redd Roofing, the employer - 40% negligent and Edward 
Esquivel, the deceased - 20% negligent. The settled amount against 
these defendants was $375,000. The liability of the Freeport 
Center was noted in the settlement agreement to have been 
vigorously contested. Petitioners' basis for liability was the 
claim that Freeport Center, as land owner of the buildings on which 
Redd Roofing, an independent contractor was working, should have 
responsibility for the safety of Redd Roofing's workers. Based on 
the settlement agreement, the parties agreed to compromise and 
settle the matter on a full and final basis as follows: 
a) The petitioners pay respondents the sum of $8,263.84. 
This sum represents payment in full of any lien or subrogation 
owning CNA for death or dependency. Respondents acknowledge 
that there is no further claim for offset, re-payment, 
subrogation or the like on any amounts paid for benefits to 
this point. 
b) The decedent's weekly compensation was noted to be $205 
per week and this was determined to be the weekly compensation 
rate determining all future benefits to which the surviving 
petitioners may be entitled. 
Respondents argue that subsequent or even during the period 
this agreement was being negotiated the petitioners were planning 
to sue Gravely International which was the maker of the machine 
used to clean the roof of the Freeport Center building in question. 
The petitioners deny this and indicate that the arguments show that 
they were merely looking into the possibility of suit against 
Gravely International. 
The petitioners assert that respondents were informed of the 
possibility of a third party action on the products liability 
issue. 
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As evidence for this the petitioners cite to the Compromise 
and Settlement of a Disputed Claim between the same parties in the 
instant hearing and the related Order of Approval which was 
previously discussed. The exhibit which is part of that original 
Compromise and Settlement Agreement shows a disbursement sheet with 
$10,000 withheld as advanced cost for product liability litigation. 
The footnote on that exhibit indicates that there will be an 
investigation into the case and that if there is no reasonable 
basis to pursue the case, the remaining monies will be disbursed to 
the beneficiaries in the same proportions as paid out of the 
settlement monies. Thus it appears that there was a possible third 
party action that could take place and that the respondents were 
informed about it at the time. However, it is also noted that none 
of those representing the petitioners felt that there was any great 
possibility of additional monies being obtained based on a theory 
of product liability. 
The petitioners assert that with regard to any amount received 
from Gravely International, the 1994 settlement agreement, and the 
letter dated March 15, 1994 from Kerry L. Chlarson to Mr. Theodore 
Kanell, attorney for respondents in this case shows that " . . . 
this check, along with a reduced workers' compensation payment to 
Norma Esquivel, completely and fully satisfies any subrogation your 
client, CNA Insurance Company, may have had against any settlement 
proceeds the Esquivels and Ofelia Herrera may have received from 
the Freeport Center or may receive from any other third party." 
The federal jury did return a verdict in favor of the 
Esquivels, finding total damages in the amount of $814,029. 
However, the jury found Gravely International 25 percent at fault. 
It apportioned 25 percent of the liability for the fall to Edward 
Esquivel and 50 percent to Redd Roofing. Therefore, the Esquivels 
were awarded a gross judgment of only 25 five percent of the total 
damages or $203,507.25. 
With regard to the issues of reimbursement, UCA §3 5-1-62 
(5)(b)(ii) (1993 as amended) provides that the amount reimbursable 
to the person liable for compensation benefits shall be reduced by 
the percentage of fault attributable to "the employer, officer, 
agent, or employee of the employer. . . if the combined percentage 
of fault attributed to persons immune from suit is determined to be 
forty percent or more." 
In this case, the fault attributable to the employer was 50 
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percent. When Mr. Esquivel's fault as an employee is also 
included, that would cause the total fault by which the amount 
reimbursable to the insurance carrier to be reduced to 75 percent. 
Thus, only 25 percent of the total amount the carrier is liable for 
is to be reimbursed to the carrier. UCA §35-1-62 (1993 as amended) 
paragraph five requires that, " . . . any recovery obtained against 
a third person be disbursed as follows: (a) the reasonable 
expense of the action, including attorneys fees, shall be paid and 
charged proportionately against the parties as their interest may 
appear. Any fee chargeable to the employer or carrier is to be a 
credit upon any fee payable to the injured employee or, in the case 
of death, to the dependents, for any recovery had against the third 
party. 
At paragraph B, the statute says that the person liable for 
compensation payments shall be reimbursed, less the proportionate 
share of costs and attorneys' fees provided for in subsection 
(5)(a) as follows: 
* * * 
"(ii) less the amount of payments made multiplied by the 
percentage of fault attributed to the employer, officer, 
agent, or employee of the employer in the action against the 
third party if the combined percentage of fault attributed to 
persons immune from suit is determined to be forty percent or 
more prior to any allocation of fault under subsection 78-27-
39 (2)." 
Since the employer had 50 percent fault attributed to him this 
paragraph is applicable. CNA has paid $21,320 to the Esquivels in 
workers7 compensation benefits since the Freeport Center dispute 
was resolved until the day of judgment. CNA is required reasonably 
to pay an additional $126,602 in benefits to the Esquivels. CNA is 
responsible to pay future benefits based upon benefits being paid 
until the youngest child reaches her eighteenth birthday. Prettvman 
v. Utah Dept. of Finance, 496 P. 2d 89 (Utah) held that future 
payments are included in calculating the interest of the 
compensation carrier in a settlement or judgment against a third 
party. Including all past, present, and future payments leaves a 
total liability of workers compensation benefits for CNA in the 
amount of $147,922, making the interest of or exposure to CNA in an 
amount of $147,922. 
Gravely International was determined by the Federal Court to 
be 2 5 percent at fault. Based upon the statute, reducing the 
reimbursement by the percentage of fault attributable to the 
employer and his employees (75%), or others immune from suit, the 
total amount of reimbursement payable to CNA would be $147,922 
00166 
EDWARD ESQUIVEL 
ORDER 
PAGE SEVEN 
CNA can have no more interest in the judgment received by the 
Esquivels than the amount which CNA would have to pay out in 
medical expenses, burial expenses, and death benefits. This amount 
is $147,922. This is a ceiling on the amount to which CNA has an 
interest. 
CNA has an interest in the recovery or judgment and its 
interest is more accurately stated to be in the net recovery and 
not the gross. In other words, CNA's interest is not in the total 
amount of $203,507.25, but is only in the net judgment which cannot 
be more than $147,922 in any event, and in this case is $203,507.25 
minus attorneys' fees and costs. An attorneys' interest in the 
judgment is in the fees and costs. CNA's interest is only the 
remaining money after fees and costs have been paid as long as it 
is less than the ceiling noted. CNA has no claim to the fees or 
costs, in fact it has an obligation to contribute to those 
expenses. Gross recovery, minus attorneys fees including costs, 
equals net recovery. 
The gross amount of recovery was $203,507.25. The gross 
amount minus $81,402.90 in attorneys' fees and $53,596.38 in costs 
equals $68,507.97. Therefore, CNA's interest is reduced to 
$68,507.97. This amount is the amount which will be received by 
the Esquivels after all expenses of trial. Certainly, CNA should 
receive no credit for any amount greater than that received by the 
Esquivels. If CNA were to receive credit for a greater amount than 
$68,507.97, CNA would not be paying its proportionate share of the 
expenses as its "interest may appear.11 With regard to the practice 
of the parties being charged a set percentage or fraction of the 
fee at the conclusion of the trial, it is not in accordance with 
the statute which requires the parties to contribute or be given 
credit for fees and costs according to their monetary interest in 
the case. 
In order to calculate CNA's proportionate share of fees, the 
first item to be considered is CNA's interest. In this case, CNA 
has an interest only in the net recovery since it is less than the 
amount which has and will be paid by CNA. The net recovery amounts 
to $68,507.25 which is the money available for reimbursement. CNA 
is potentially entitled to 100 percent of the available $68,507.25. 
Since CNA has a claim for 100 percent of the net recovery, it must 
pay 100 percent of the attorneys' fees and costs. The amount of 
attorneys' fees and costs is $134,999.28. Since CNA's 
proportionate share of fees and costs is $134,999.28, CNA's lien 
must be reduced by that amount. The lien amount credited to CNA is 
thus zero since the fees and costs were greatly in excess of the 
net amount recovered. CNA is thus not given credit for any offset 
or reimbursement. This formula is somewhat more complicated than 
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simple, but improper formula used to compute proportionate shares 
of fees and costs. It was evidently the intent of the legislature 
to require the party obligated to pay workers' compensation to con-
tribute the proportion of the share of fees and costs representing 
the proportion of the monetary interest that party has in the 
outcome of the case. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
Under UCA §35-1-62(5) (1993 as amended), it is determined that 
CNA's proportionate amount of costs and fees is $134,999.28 and 
CNA's lien must be reduced by that amount. Since the total amount 
of CNA's lien is only $68,507.97, CNA is not entitled to any 
reimbursement from the third party action against Gravely 
International. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Redd Roofing and or CNA Insurance 
shall pay $205 per week, in accordance with the Compromise 
Settlement of a Disputed Claim and Order of Approval dated March 7, 
1994 with interest from April 2, 1996. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be received by the Commission in writing within 
thirty (30) days of the date hereof, specifying in detail the 
particular errors and objections, and, unless so received, this 
Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. In the 
event a Motion for Review is timely received, the parties shall 
have fifteen (15) days from the date of receipt by the Commission, 
in which to file a written response with the Commission in 
accordance with Section 63-46b-12(2), Utah Code Annotated. 
Dated this / day of / <£^^*~^/ , 1997 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Sims 
Law Judge 
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D
Norma Esquivel 
2631 F Avenue 
Ogden UT 84401 
Robert Sykes, Atty 
311 S State St #240 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Theodore Kanell, Atty 
PO Box 2970 
Salt Lake City UT 84110-2970 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
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THEODORE E. KANELL (1768) 
STEPHEN P. HORVAT (6249) 
HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
Post Office Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 
(801) 363-7611 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DEPENDENTS OF EDWARD ESQUIVEL, 
Deceased, 
Applicants, 
REDD ROOFING & CONSTRUCTION 
CO., and CNA INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
Come now the defendants, Redd Roofing, Inc., and CNA Insurance 
Company, through their counsel of record, and file this Motion for 
Review of the Order dated February 7, 1997, entered by Judge 
Benjamin A. Sims in the above-captioned matter. 
INTRODUCTION 
This action involves the apportionment of proceeds recovered 
in a third-party tort action. In 1994, CNA Insurance Company began 
paying weekly death benefits to the dependents of Edward Esquivel, 
who had died in a work-related accident while employed by Redd 
Roofing. But in 1996, the Esquivels received over sixty-eight 
thousand dollars in a tort action against a third party, Gravely 
International. On February 7, 1997, the Honorable Benjamin A. 
* 
* MOTION FOR REVIEW OF ORDER 
* 
* 
* Case No. 96670 
* 
* 
* 
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Sims, administrative law judge, entered an Order p^bvidin^ that/CtiA 
was not entitled to any reimbursement or credit against its future 
payments to the Esquivels.1 However, section 35-1-62 (!)) (jc) of the 
Utah Workers' Compensation Act requires that any money recovered in 
a third-party tort action by the dependents of an injured employee 
must be applied to reduce or satisfy the workers' compensation 
insurer's future obligations. Therefore, CNA now respectfully 
requests that the Order be set aside, and that the money recovered 
by the Esquivels be used to reduce CNA's obligations to make future 
weekly benefit payments. 
FACTS 
On April 26, 1993, the decedent, Edward Esquivel, sustained a 
fatal injury when he fell off a roof while working for defendant 
Redd Roofing, Inc., who was insured by defendant CNA Insurance 
Company. CNA began paying benefits to his dependents (the 
Esquivels). In 1994, the Esquivels received $375,000 from Freeport 
Center Associates, the owner of the building in which the accident 
happened. The Esquivels and CNA then entered into an agreement in 
which CNA agreed to pay $205 per week for as long as the dependents 
were entitled to receive death benefits under the workers' compen-
sation law.2 The decedent's youngest child will turn eighteen on 
January 5, 2008. CNA also agreed to accept $8,263.84 to satisfy 
*A copy of this Order is attached as Exhibit 1. 
2This figure represents the statutory maximum rate at the time 
of the accident, $341, times sixty percent. 
> > > > > 
its workers' compensation lien rights that had ^£crued; up Mritil 
that point. This agreement was approved by the Industrial 
Commission on March 7, 1994. ; ; ^ 
The Esquivels then pursued another third-party tort action, 
against Gravely International, the maker of the roof-sweeper that 
Mr. Esquivel was using when the accident occurred. However, the 
Esquivels failed to notify CNA that they were pursuing this other 
action, and they failed to notify CNA that Gravely was attempting 
to attribute a portion of the fault to the employer. This failure 
to notify CNA violated subsections (3)(a) and (3)(b) of Utah Code 
Ann. § 35-1-62. 
In the action against Gravely, the jury found that the total 
damages were $814,029, and fault was apportioned as follows: 
twenty-five percent to Gravely, fifty percent to Redd Roofing, and 
twenty-five percent to Edward Esquivel. Therefore, on April 9, 
1996, Judge Tena Campbell entered an order awarding the Esquivels 
$203,507.25. The costs of pursuing this action were $53,596.38, 
and the attorneys' fees amounted to $81,402.90. Thus, the amount 
to be disbursed after the costs and fees were paid was $68,507.97. 
After the judgment was entered, CNA stopped making the weekly 
payments, because the Workers' Compensation Act provides that a 
workers' compensation insurer has a right of reimbursement and 
future credit for any money recovered by an injured employee or his 
dependents. CNA's most recent payment was made on March 27, 1996, 
covering the period through April 1, 1996. From the time of the 
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total of $21,320. 
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requiring CNA to continue making the $205 weekly payments, 
notwithstanding that the applicants had just received the money in 
their tort action against Gravely. CNA has opposed, because 
section 35-1-62(5) provides that (1) CNA is entitled to at least 
partial reimbursement for amounts paid the Esquivels so far, and 
(2) any remaining amounts recovered by the Esquivels must be 
applied to satisfy or reduce CNA's future obligation to the 
Esquivels. On February 7, 1997, the Honorable Benjamin A. Sims, 
administrative law judge, entered an Order providing that the 
Esquivels were entitled to keep the entire $68,507.97, but CNA was 
not entitled to any reimbursement or offset or reduction in its 
future obligations. The Order thus requires CNA to continue to 
make weekly payments of $205 to the Esquivels. 
CNA hereby seeks review of the Order of February 7, 1997. The 
Order incorrectly requires CNA to continue to make weekly payments 
to the Esquivels, even though the Esquivels received $68,507.97 
from their tort action. The Order addresses several complex 
questions, but regardless of these issues, there is one inescapable 
fact: the Esquivels ended up with the money. Under section 35-1-
62(c)(5) of the Utah Code, any money recovered by a deceased 
employee's dependents must be applied to reduce or satisfy the 
workers' compensation insurer's future obligations to the 
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dependents. Moreover, when the $68,507.97 is audited; to CWAfs 
future obligations, accounting principles and Industrial Commission 
regulations require that those future payments must bej accounted 
to their present value in order to determine how many payments are 
represented by the lump sum. As discussed in more detail belowf a 
$68,507.97 lump sum today, invested at eight percent interest, is 
sufficient to make four hundred sixty weekly payments of $205. 
Therefore, CNA respectfully requests that a new order be entered 
providing that CNA is not required to resume making weekly payments 
to the Esquivels until January 23, 2005. 
GOVERNING STATUTE 
This case is controlled entirely by subsection (5) of Utah 
Code Ann. § 35-1-62. This subsection provides as follows: 
(5) If any recovery is obtained against a third person, it 
shall be disbursed as follows: 
(a) The reasonable expense of the action, including 
attorneys' fees, shall be paid and charged 
proportionately against the parties as their interests 
may appear. Any fee chargeable to the employer or 
carrier is to be a credit upon any fee payable by the 
injured employee or, in the case of death, by the 
dependents, for any recovery had against the third party. 
(b) The person liable for compensation payments 
shall be reimbursed, less the proportionate share of 
costs and attorneys' fees provided for in Subsection 
(5)(a), for the payments made as follows: 
(i) without reduction based on fault 
attributed to the employer, officer, agent, or employee 
of the employer in the action against the third party if 
the combined percentage of fault attributed to persons 
immune from suit is determined to be less than 40% prior 
to any reallocation of fault under Subsection 78-27-
39(2); or 
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(ii) less the amount of payty^nts Jnade,,' ' 
multiplied by the percentage of fault attributed to the 
employer, officer, agent, or employee of the employer in 
the action against the third party if the combined 
percentage of fault attributed to persons immunje jfi^ om 
suit is determined to be 40% or more prior to any 
reallocation of fault under Subsection 78-27-39(2). 
(c) The balance shall be paid to the injured 
employee or his heirs in case of death, to be applied to 
reduce or satisfy in full any obligation thereafter 
accruing against the person liable for compensation. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-62(5) (1994 repl. vol.). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE BALANCE RECOVERED BY THE ESQUIVELS IS TO BE APPLIED TO 
REDUCE CNA'S FUTURE OBLIGATIONS TO THE ESQUIVELS, SO CNA IS 
NOT REQUIRED TO RESUME MAKING PAYMENTS UNTIL JANUARY 23, 2005. 
A. Section 35-1-62(5)(c) requires that any balance remaining 
after fees, costs, and reimbursement must be used to 
reduce or satisfy the workers' compensation insurer's 
future liability to the injured employee or his 
dependents. 
The distribution of proceeds recovered from a tort action 
against a third party is governed by subsection 35-1-62(5) of the 
Utah Code, set forth above. Under subsection (5)(a), proceeds of 
an action against a third party are first to be used to pay the 
reasonable expenses of the action. Next, under subsection (5)(b), 
the person liable for compensation payments must be reimbursed, 
less its share of fees and costs, though this reimbursement is to 
be reduced by the employer's proportionate fault. For purposes of 
this argument, however, we will assume that CNA is not entitled to 
any reimbursement because the costs and fees of the tort action far 
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exceed the payments already made by CNA. The final stsp in>tiie 
distribution is directed by subsection (5)(c), which g^oyides, 
> > 
(c) The balance shall be paid to the injured emplc>yete,or 
his heirs in case of death, to be applied to retiuce or 
satisfy in full any obligation thereafter accruing 
against the person liable for compensation. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-62(5)(c) (emphasis added). In other words, 
after the fees and costs have been paid, and after any reimburse-
ment has been taken care of, any money left over is to be paid to 
the injured employee or his dependents, but the workers' compen-
sation insurer is entitled to a setoff against its future payments. 
In the tort action against Gravely International, the gross 
recovery was $203,507.25. After the attorneys' fees and costs were 
paid, there was a remaining balance of $68,507.97. This amount is 
left over, regardless of how much the reimbursement amount is 
reduced,3 and regardless of how the costs and fees are apportioned. 
3The reduction of CNA's reimbursement share is ultimately 
irrelevant, because any amount not reimbursed becomes part of the 
remaining balance, which is to be applied to reduce CNA's future 
obligations as provided by subsection (5)(c). But if it becomes an 
issue, the percentage of fault attributable to Edward Esquivel 
(25%) should not be included in the fault attributable to the 
employer when calculating the percentage by which CNA's 
reimbursement should be reduced under section 35-1-62(5)(b)(ii). 
The phrase "officer, agent, or employee of the employer" does not 
include the decedent. Throughout section 35-1-62, whenever the 
statute intends to refer to the employee who suffered the accident, 
it uses the phrase "injured employee." Thus CNA would be entitled 
to be reimbursed $10,660, which is the amount of payments it has 
already made ($21,320) reduced by Redd Roofing's proportionate 
share of fault (50%). But because any remaining balance is to be 
applied to CNA's future obligations anyway, CNA waives its right to 
reimbursement, as long as the balances are applied in accordance 
with the governing statute. 
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The Order is correct in holding that the money should go to»tiie 
Esquivelsf but the plain language of the statute estaj^isjies that 
CNA is entitled to be substantially relieved of its lJJabiL.\ity for 
future weekly payments. 
The Order incorrectly concluded that CNA was not entitled to 
be relieved from any of its future payments. It appears that this 
mistake occurred because the administrative law judge got caught up 
in the issues and calculations and inadvertently subtracted the 
costs and fees of the tort action twice. In the paragraph 
beginning at the bottom of page sixf the Order notes that the gross 
recovery was $203,507.25, but the attorneys' fees were $81,402.90, 
and the costs were $53,596.38. Consequently, the net recovery was 
$68f507.97. The Order states, "Therefore, CNA's interest is 
reduced to $68,507.97." However, in the next paragraph, the Order 
reasons because CNA is responsible for one hundred percent of the 
fees and costs, or $134,999.28, that amount should be taken out of 
the $68,507.97, leading to the conclusion that CNA's lien is 
reduced to zero. Thus the Order provided that CNA was not entitled 
to any reimbursement or offset against its future liability. 
This result is illogical and violates section 35-1-62. As 
demonstrated above, the error here is that the fees and costs were 
subtracted twice: the fees and costs were subtracted from the 
gross recovery to determine the $68,507.97 "net proceeds" in the 
paragraph beginning at the bottom of page six, and the fees and 
costs were again subtracted from the $68,507.97 to reduce CNA's 
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lien to zero. The end result of this error is that the fasquiveis 
received all the benefit of the recovery, but CNA did^ ijot^  receive 
any reimbursement or setoff against its future obligatjiohs. 
The reasoning in the Order is rather complex; it addresses 
several issues, such as the proper reduction of CNA's reimburse-
ment, the calculation of each party's "interest" in the action, and 
whether the fees and costs should be taken from the gross recovery 
or net recovery. However, it is unnecessary to address these 
issues, because one simple, undisputed fact persists: when the 
dust settles, there is still $68,507.97 remaining! This money 
remains regardless of the outcome of the other questions. The 
issue in this case, then, is simply what happens to that money. As 
set forth above, section 35-1-62(5) plainly describes what is 
supposed to happen to the leftover money: after the costs, fees, 
and reimbursement are taken care of, the remaining balance goes to 
the Esquivels, to be applied to reduce or satisfy CNA's future 
obligations. 
Because CNA will receive the benefit of the entire amount 
recovered from Gravely, we concede that CNA is responsible to pay 
all the attorney fees and costs.4 We also concede for present 
4This assumes that section 35-1-62(5)(c) will be followed, and 
the $68,507.97 remaining will be applied to reduce CNA's future 
obligations. If not, however, then CNA is not responsible for the 
entire amount of attorney fees, but only for an amount in propor-
tion to the actual benefit it receives. Moreover, in deducting 
fees and costs, the amounts have to be taken from the gross 
recovery. See, e.g., Graham v. Industrial Commission, 26 Utah 2d 
424, 491 P.2d 223, 224 (1971) ("the net award to the plaintiff 
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purposes that the fees and costs are reasonable, and that? the > fees 
and costs can be taken out of CNA's reimbursement
 f inst^^d ,of being 
apportioned between CNA's reimbursement and the bala&co >due the 
Esquivels.5 But the fees and costs must be subtracted from the 
gross proceeds, not the net proceeds. Taking the amount out of the 
net proceeds would be incorrect because, by the very definition, 
the "net proceeds" are what is left over after the fees and costs 
have already been paid. Because the fees and costs are in reality 
paid out of the gross recovery, the proportionate shares of the 
fees and costs have to be taken from the gross recovery. The 
correct calculation is much simpler: 
Gross recovery: $203,507.25 
CNA's share of fees and costs: $134,999.28 
Balance remaining $ 68,507.97 
But as explained above, there is no real need to get caught up 
in these issues. All that ultimately matters is that, no matter 
how the calculations are made, there is a balance of $68,507.97 
would be the amount of the total expenses multiplied by a fraction, 
the numerator of which would be the award and the denominator of 
which would be the $95,000 [the amount of the settlement before 
fees and costs were deducted], less any amount heretofore paid to 
plaintiff."). See also Cameron v. Minidoka County Highway 
District, 874 P.2d 1108, 1109 (Idaho 1994). 
5Again, this assumes that the $68,507.97 will be applied to 
CNA's future obligations. If not, CNA argues that the costs and 
fees are not reasonable, and that the costs and fees should be 
charged proportionally to the amount of its reimbursement and the 
balance going to the Esquivels. 
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remaining after the costs and fees have been paicL' The Esquivels 
are entitled to recover this amount, but it must be u s ^ t,o offset 
CNA's future obligation to pay workers' compensation benefits. 
Otherwise, the Esquivels would be receiving a double recovery: 
they would receive the entire $68,507.97, and they would continue 
to receive weekly payments for the next eleven years. Thus, the 
Order violates the unambiguous language of 35-1-62(5)(c). CNA 
therefore requests that the Order be set aside, and that the 
$68,507.97 be applied to reduce CNA's future obligations to the 
Esquivels. 
B. The amount of CNA's future obligations should be . 
discounted to present value in determining the amount of 
CNA's credit. 
The Esquivels received the judgment for $68,507.97 on April 9, 
1996, to be applied to satisfy CNA's obligation to make future 
payments. CNA's obligation under the workers' compensation law is 
to pay $205 per week until approximately January 5, 2008. But 
under basic principles of accounting, $205 paid on, say, March 7, 
1997, is worth substantially more than $205 due to be paid on 
March 7, 2007.6 Therefore, in determining the number of weekly 
payments represented by the $68,507.97 recovered in 1996, the 
amount of each future weekly payment must be discounted to its 
6At the eight percent discount rate provided by Rule R568-1-
11, a $205 payment due in ten years is worth $94.96 today. 
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present value. CNA should then be given credit for the number' of 
discounted weekly payments that can be made from $68,507^97. 
Discounting is required under the Industrial C>oirinAss ion's 
regulations. These regulations provide that when a lump sum 
payment is made to satisfy future weekly obligations, the future 
payments shall be discounted using a rate of eight percent. Rule 
R568-1-11 provides that 
Eight percent shall be used for any discounting or 
present value calculations. Lump sums ordered by the 
Commission of any permanent partial benefit award . . . 
or of any other sum being paid earlier than normally paid 
under a weekly benefit method shall be subject to the 8% 
discounting. 
(Emphasis added.) In our case, the Esquivels have received a lump 
sum of $68,507.97, which was paid earlier than it would normally be 
paid under the weekly benefit method. Therefore Rule R568-1-11 
applies, and each future payment must be discounted to its present 
value to determine how much that payment is "worth" today. Each 
discounted future weekly payment should then be subtracted from the 
balance, until the $68,507.97 is exhausted. CNA should be given 
credit for that number of future payments, and it should resume 
paying $205 per week after that number of weeks has expired. 
Instead of calculating the present value of each weekly 
payment CNA was scheduled to make (from April 9, 1996, to 
January 5, 2008, is approximately 613 weeks), the effect of the 
lump sum on CNA's future payments can be determined by calculating 
the future value of the $68,507.97 lump sum. That is, it is 
-12-
relatively easy to calculate how many weekly payments couid be^ macie 
from the lump sum if the lump sum were invested and earji^ d interest 
> > > 
at the discount rate. The theory behind discounting o.s^that the 
person who receives the lump sum will invest the money, which will 
earn interest throughout the time in which periodic payments should 
be made. And according to the accounting firm of Mann, Weitz and 
Associates, L.L.C., of Deerfield, Illinois, a $68,507.97 lump sum, 
received on April 9, 1996, earning interest at the prescribed rate 
of eight percent per year, will be sufficient to make 460 weekly 
payments of $205 per week. 
Four hundred sixty weeks translates to approximately eight 
years and forty-three weeks. Because CNA's last payment was made 
on March 27, 1996, its next payment should not be due until January 
23, 2005. At that time CNA should resume making its payments at 
$205 per week, for as long as any of Edward Esquivel's dependents 
are entitled to receive death benefits under the Workers' 
Compensation Act. 
If CNA and the Esquivels decided to enter into a lump sum 
agreement to take care of CNA's entire expected liability, the 
regulation is clear that the eight percent discount rate would be 
used to determine how much CNA would have to pay today to satisfy 
its entire future obligation.7 There is no reason why the cal-
7In fact, even if the Esquivels had not recovered the money in 
their tort action, CNA could pay off its entire future obligation, 
through January 5, 2008, with a lump sum payment of $83,000. 
-13-
culation should be any different when the lump • sum payment: is 
received as a result of a tort action against a third,,party. The 
> > 
practice of discounting has nothing to do with the sciirio of the 
lump sum payment; it is merely a realization of the basic 
accounting principle that a given sum of money is more valuable 
today than it will be in the future. 
Even without discounting, the $68,507.97 recovery by the 
Esquivels is enough to make 334 payments of $205. Thus, at a 
minimum, CNA should not be required to make another payment until 
approximately August 21, 2002. However, the Industrial 
Commission's regulations, as well as basic principles of 
accounting, require that the future payments be discounted in 
calculating the effect of the lump sum recovered by the Esquivels. 
Therefore, CNA's future payments to the Esquivels should be 
discounted to their present value, and CNA should not be required 
to resume making weekly payments to the Esquivels until January 23, 
2005. 
CONCLUSION 
CNA therefore respectfully requests that Judge Sims' Order of 
February 7, 1997, be set aside, and that a new order be issued, 
that CNA is not required to make weekly payments to the Esquivels 
until January 23, 2005. 
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ROBERT B. SYKES (#3180) 
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
EDWARD ESQUIVEL, deceased, ) APPLICANTS' RESPONSE TO 
NORMA ESQUIVEL, RICHARD ) DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
ESQUIVEL, ANGEL ESQUIVEL, ) REVIEW OF ORDER 
EDICA ESQUIVEL and OFELIA ) 
HERRERA, ) 
Applicants, ) 
v. ) Case No. 96670 
REDD ROOFING & ) 
CONSTRUCTION CO., and CNA ) 
COMPANY, ) 
Defendants. ) 
Applicants, by and through their counsel of record, file this Response to the 
Defendants' Motion for Review of Order. Administrative Law Judge Benjamin A. Sims 
entered an order dated February 7,1997. On March 7,1997, the defendants filed a Motion 
for Review. By stipulation, defendants granted Applicants leave to file their response by 
Wednesday, April 2, 1997. 
INTRODUCTION 
The issues to be decided in this Motion for Review involve the distribution 
of proceeds generated from a judgment entered in an action filed by the Applicants against 
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a third party who was found liable for the death of the Applicants' l^band, father and son. 
Specifically, the question is whether the Admirii^rative Law Judge correctly apportioned the 
fees and costs involved in bringing the third party lawsuit The Administrative Law Judge 
followed the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 35-lT52(5)^and apportioned the assessment 
of the attorneys fees and costs for recovering a third-party judgment based upon the 
proportional interests of the parties. The defendants objected and insisted that the attorneys 
fees and costs should be apportioned based upon a fiction, or as though plaintiffs had 
recovered the entire amount of the $203,000 judgment, without taking into account the 
attorneys fees and costs actually incurred. In the alternative, defendants requested that only 
a set percentage or fraction of the fee be assessed against it, in essence asking the 
Commission to totally disregard the statutory language of § 35-1-62(5). The defendants had 
earlier requested that the Applicants "settle" for a payment of $40,000 to write off a 
$147,000 obligation. The Administrative Law Judge declined to disregard § 35-1-62(5), as 
requested by defendants, and proceeded to apportion the attorneys fees and costs as set 
forth in the order. 
The Order of the Administrative Law Judge accurately reflects the agreement 
of the parties that this dispute involves only questions of law as the parties stipulated to the 
essential facts of the case. For the purpose of providing an adequate factual background 
to this dispute, we state the following: 
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FACTS 
, > > i > > 
j > > > * ' 
1. On April 26, 1993, EdwaWI Esquivel the foqsljand, father and son1 of 
the Applicants, was killed while working on a roof at the Freeport Center for Redd Roofing 
Construction Company (Redd Roofing). The CNA ^nsjirpnce Company (CNA) was the 
worker's compensation carrier for Redd Roofing at the time of Mr. EsquiveFs death. The 
Applicants were dependent upon the decedent at the time of his death. Therefore, CNA 
began paying the statutorily-required benefits to the Applicants. 
I 2. In 1994, the Applicants, with the consent of CNA, entered into a 
settlement with the Freeport Center, a third party who the Applicants felt was responsible 
i for the death of Edward Esquivel. The settlement was for $375,000. The amount of 
i 
I reimbursement and offset to which CNA was entitled was disputed then, as it is now. 
i 
However, the Applicants and CNA were able to reach a negotiated settlement. The 
I 
I settlement resulted in the Applicants reimbursing CNA $8,263.84, and a forty percent (40%) 
I reduction in weekly benefits, from $341 per week to $205 per week. 
3. The settlement agreement with CNA reflected that $10,000 from the 
settlement with the Freeport Center was set aside for the investigation and possible lawsuit 
J against Gravely International (Gravely), the manufacturer of the machine Mr. Esquivel was 
I using at the time of his death. Exhibit A, p. 9. CNA was informed of this investigation, 
even though at the time there was little evidence that the machine was defective.2 
1Norma Esquivel was the deceased's wife. At the time of Edwards death, he had four minor children Kdward 
Jr., Richard, Angel and Edica. Ofelia Herrera was his totally dependent mother. 
I 2Whether or not CNA was informed of the lawsuit by the Applicants is disputed, but that issue is m , devant 
to this Motion for Review. In any event, it is undisputed that CNA was aware of the lawsuit filed by the Applica** v i gainst 
Gravely International, the manufacturer of the machine, in plenty of time to protect its interests. This is esta hed by 
the fact that CNA's attorney, Ted Kanell, participated in a deposition months before the case went to trial. >». Exhibit 
I B, deposition of CNA investigator, Brad Bennett. 
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4. Several facts demonstrate that CNA was botfr ^ware that Applicants 
were pursuing a third-party action and that GMvely was *atteiqpt»ig to attribute a portion 
of fault to the employer. First of all, CNA undertook, an investigation of the original 
accident in 1993, taking numerous pictures and, statements. This information wad 
subpoenaed by both sides during the litigation. The investigator was deposed, and the 
deposition was vigorously defended by Mr. Kanell, the attorney for CNA. The tenure of the 
questions at the deposition by the third-party defense counsel, Mr. Kanell's sophistication 
in personal injury matters, as well as several conversations with counsel for the Applicants, 
indicated to Mr. Kanell that Gravely was claiming that the employer was negligent. It would 
have been patently obvious to any defense attorney that such a claim would be made in ai 
case where an untethered employee was using heavy equipment near the edge of a roof with 
the approval of the supervisor, and subsequently fell to his death. 
5. A lawsuit was eventually filed against Gravely International, the 
manufacturer of the machine Mr. Esquivel was operating at the time of his death. The case 
was tried to a jury in March, 1996. On April 9, 1996, Judge Tena Campbell entered a 
judgment awarding the Applicants $203,507.25. The jury found the total damages to be 
$814,029, but apportioned fault between Gravely International, Mr. Esquivel, and Redd 
Roofing. The jury found that Gravely International was only twenty-five percent (25%) 
responsible for the death of Mr. Esquivel, so judgment was entered for only $203,507.25. 
Mr. Esquivel was also found to be twenty-five percent (25%) at fault. However, the jury 
found Redd Roofing, the employer, to be fifty percent (50%) at fault. Mr. Kanell attended 
several sessions of the trial. 
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6. The attorneys' fees in the third party action were $81,402.90. The out- j 
of-pocket costs of the action were $53,596.38.1 >Thiis, thq total di? attorneys' fees and costs | 
was $134,999.28. 
7. As soon as the verdict was reached, CNA stopped sending the weekly 
worker's compensation benefit payments to the Applicants. 
8. From the time of the negotiated settlement between CNA and the j 
Applicants regarding the settlement with the Freeport Center in 1994 until CNA stopped 
making weekly payments, CNA had paid $21,320 to the Applicants. 
9. Attempts were made to resolve the issue of reimbursement and offset 
with CNA but they proved futile. Therefore, the Applicants filed a Request for Hearing to | 
let an Administrative Law Judge decide how much reimbursement and offset CNA was to 
receive. 
10. A hearing was held before the Honorable Benjamin A. Sims. He issued 
his decision entitled "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order" on February 7, i 
1997. Exhibit C. Judge Sims decided that CNA was not entitled to any reimbursement or I 
offset. CNA then filed a Motion for Review of Order. This Memorandum is in response 
to that Motion. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Judge Sims correctly determined that CNA's proportional share of fees and 
costs was 100%. Furthermore, Judge Sims correctly concluded that, since CNA's 
proportionate share of fees and costs exceeded the amount of money available for 
reimbursement and offset, CNA was not entitled to any reimbursement or offset. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-62(5) provides the method for determining how 
, > > > ' j 
> > > ) > > > » 
proceeds collected from a liable third party are3 iq be divided between the injured employee 
or his dependents and the entity responsible for worker's compensation benefits. Judge 
Sims relied upon this statute in making his decision regarding CNA's right to reimbursement 
and offset. CNA disagrees with Judge Sims' application of that statute to this case. 
However, Judge Sims correctly applied the statute to the facts and reached the correct 
decision. 
POINT I 
JUDGE SIMS USED THE CORRECT MATHEMATICAL 
FORMULA TO DETERMINE CNA'S PROPORTIONATE 
SHARE OF COSTS AND FEES. 
In order to determine CNA's proportionate share of fees and costs as required 
by the statute, Judge Sims applied a simple mathematical formula. Interest / available 
money = proportionate share. A simple example of this mathematical formula 
demonstrates the correctness of it. Suppose $100 is placed on a table. Suppose that $50 
of that $100 is CNA's. CNA's interest in that $100 is $50. CNA's interest / available money 
= proportionate share shows CNA's proportionate share to be 1/2 or 50% (50/100=1/2). 
Therefore, if it cost $10 in order to retrieve the $100 from the table, CNA's proportionate 
share of that cost would be the cost times its proportionate share ($10 x 50%), or $5.00. 
Determining CNA's "interest'' is crucial to the outcome of this Motion for 
Review. Under Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-62(5), the distribution of monies received in a 
lawsuit against a third person can only be determined by first determining the "interest" of 
the employer or insurance carrier. The proportionate interests of the parties determine how 
much of the attorneys' fees and costs will be charged to the respective parties. Accordingly, 
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the statute requires that "the reasonable expense of the action, including attorneys' fees, 
] > » > > » 
shall be paid and charged proportionately against the parties as iHeir interests may appear." \ 
(emphasis added) Utah Code Ann. § 35-l-63(5)(a). I 
The "fee chargeable to the employer oi> carrier" is a "credit" upon "any fee 
payable by the injured employee . . . for any recovery had against the third party." Id. j 
Therefore, CNA's proportionate share of attorneys' fees and costs, based upon its "interest," | 
is to be deducted from the attorneys' fees and costs paid by the Applicants, as a "credit." 
In other words, CNA pays that portion of the Applicants' attorneys' fees and costs as i 
determined by the proportion of its "interest" as compared to the Applicants' interest. I 
Depending upon the size of the judgment or settlement, it is certainly possible that the j 
Applicants' "interest" could be far greater than CNA's "interest." It is also possible, j 
depending upon the outcome at trial, that the Applicants would receive a small amount | 
compared to a large interest by the carrier. Therefore, the formula certainly contemplates I 
a wide panoply of situations, one of which is a 100% charge of attorneys' fees and costs to i 
the employer or carrier. | 
In order to use this formula, Judge Sims first calculated the "interest" of CNA j 
in the third party lawsuit. He determined that CNA's interest was equal to its total 
i 
obligation. As so forcefully noted by CNA in its Motion for Review, the worker's | 
i 
compensation carrier is entitled to reimbursement before any money is given to the injured | 
employee. CNA also pointed out that any money received by an injured employee from a i 
liable third party would offset any future obligation the carrier may have to make weekly | 
benefit payments. Therefore, Judge Sims properly determined that since CNA could, under 
appropriate circumstances, receive all of the available money from the judgment in the form 
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of reimbursement or offset before any benefit would be received by,tie Applicants, CNA's 
maximum possible "interest" in the judgment'amounted; tQ its^Otrfl obligation. 
Judge Sims determined that CNA hac^pajd the Applicants $21,320 since 
> > > 
> > 
March, 1994, the date of the previous settlement^ .He/also calculated that CNA wad 
obligated to make payments of $205 per week at least until the 18th birthday of the 
youngest child of Mr. Esquivel, which amount to a total of $126,602. These amounts are 
undisputed. The Judge therefore concluded that the maximum possible amount ofl 
reimbursement and offset available to CNA was $147,922 ($21,320 + $126,602 = $147,922). 
Since CNA was entitled to $147,922 in reimbursement and /or offset before the Applicants 
would receive any benefit, Judge Sims corrected decidedly that CNA's maximum possible 
"interest" in the third party lawsuit was $147,922. 
Next the Judge decided that only $68,507.97 was available for distribution to 
Applicants from the lawsuit. This was the amount of money left after the fees and costs had 
been subtracted from the actual judgment. The judgment was for $203,507.25, the fees were 
$81,402.90, and the costs were $53,596.38. The decision to use the net judgment instead ofl 
the gross judgment was based upon the fact that the attorney is the only one who has an 
interest in the fees and costs once it has been determined what that amount is going to be. 
The Applicants could receive only the money available after fees and costs had been 
deducted or $68,507.97. 
The statutory requirement is that the employer be "charged proportionately" 
its share of attorneys' fees and costs as "the parties . . . interests may appear." A 
proportional formula showing the interests of the parties is as follows: 
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CNA's interest - $147,922.00 
Available money - $ 68,^7.97 ,>' ' '' i J' 
Applying the simple mathematical formula described above to determine CNA's 
> > > » 
proportionate share of fees and costs demonstrates that CNA's possible interest exceeds the 
available money ($147,922 / $68,507.97). Since CNA cannot have an interest greater than 
the money available, the Judge properly reduced CNA's interest to $68,507.97, or the total j 
available money. CNA's Interest / Money available ($68,507.97 / $68,507.97) shows that | 
CNA's proportionate share of fees and costs is equal to 100%. I 
The Administrative Law Judge's Order correctly concluded that the 
Defendants were 100% liable for attorneys' fees and costs incurred in the prosecution of the | 
lawsuit against Gravely International. See, Breen v. Caesars Palace, 715 P.2d 1070 (Nev.
 t 
1986) (allocating the parties respective shares of fees and costs based on net settlement 
proceeds), attached as Exhibit D. See also, Worthen v. Shurtleff and Andrews, Inc., 426 P.2d \ 
I 
223, (Utah 1967) (ruling insurer's reimbursement is made from funds remaining after | 
litigation fees and costs have been satisfied). I 
POINT II I 
JUDGE SIMS CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT SINCE 
CNA'S PROPORTIONAL SHARE OF FEES AND COSTS ' 
EXCEEDED THE AMOUNT OF MONEY AVAILABLE FOR | 
REIMBURSEMENT OR OFFSET, CNA WAS NOT ENTITLED j 
TO ANY REIMBURSEMENT OR OFFSET. | 
The real issue in this case is how CNA's share of fees and costs affects its right 
to reimbursement, and especially offset. CNA argues that its share of fees and costs only 
affects reimbursement, and that any money from the lawsuit which actually makes its way j 
into the hands of the Applicants must be offset against any future obligation it has to pay i 
- 9 -
00199 
worker's compensation benefits. This approach is contrary to Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-62(5), 
, , > > > > 
as well as unfair to the Applicants. What C&4 lias dotfe in ii$ Hrief is basically to cite 
portions of the statute selectively and out of context, ignoring the context of the entire 
> > > 
subsection 5, which supports the Applicants. J, { , 
If CNA's approach is implemented in this case, it would mean that the 
Applicants risked the costs of the lawsuit and suffered the mental anguish and difficulties 
plaintiffs must endure all for the benefit of CNA. CNA on the other hand would end up 
with a $68,507.97 windfall, having risked nothing and having done nothing to get it. The 
best way to illustrate this point is to determine how much money the Applicants would have 
received in the form of worker's compensation benefits versus how much money they would 
get if CNA has its way. Judge Sims calculated the total obligation of CNA to the Applicants 
to be $147,922. This amount reflects the money CNA would have paid had no lawsuit been 
brought. Applicants, of course, would receive this sum. 
Using the approach advocated by CNA, Applicants would receive only 
$127,342, or $20,000 less than if they had not brought suit: $21,320 (payments already 
made) + $68,507.97 (money from the lawsuit) + $37,515 (future obligation for weekly 
payment of $205 from 1/23/2005 to 1/5/2008) for a total of $127,342.97. The Applicants in 
reality would have been better off not to have brought the lawsuit at all even though they 
got a judgment for $203,507.25. This demonstrates the absurdity of CNA's position. 
Furthermore, CNA's position is not in conformity with Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-1-62(5) which requires that M[a]ny fee chargeable to the employer or carrier is to be a 
credit upon any fee payable by the injured employee or in case of death, by the dependents, for 
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any recovery had against the third party." (emphasis added) Since CNA's share of the fees 
> > > > > > > 
and costs was $134,999.28, the Applicants are fctttitled to. & "credit'> for that amount. 
The total amount of money available to the Applicants from the lawsuit is 
> > > 
$68,507.97. Therefore, Applicants are required to pay CNA a reimbursement and offset 
equal to $68,507.97 (the total amount of the judgment available to the Applicants) minus | 
CNA's proportional share of costs and fees. See Utah Code Ann. § 35-l-62(5)(b) ("The | 
person liable for compensation payments shall be reimbursed, less proportionate share of | 
t 
costs and attorneys' fees ...") The Applicants cannot possibly be required to pay more than I 
the net judgment. However, since the $68,507.97 (total amount of available money) - J 
$134,999.28 (CNA's proportional share of costs and fees) = less than zero, CNA is entitled ] 
to no money. | 
CNA claims that the fees and costs have been paid twice when the method I 
employed by Judge Sims is applied. However, that is not true. The court ordered the third 
party defendant, Gravely International, to pay the Applicants $203,507.25. Of that amount, 
the Applicants paid $134,999.28 to the attorneys for fees and costs. That money paid by the | 
Applicants for fees and costs by statute is not to be used to determine how much money an 
injured employee must reimburse a worker's compensation carrier or how much offeet is | 
available to that carrier. However, the statute provides that an employer or carrier must pay | 
I 
its proportionate share of those fees and costs as a credit to an injured employee for | 
payment already made. j 
In other words, the worker's compensation carrier must reimburse the injured | 
employee for fees and costs already paid. That reimbursement of fees and costs is to be a ' 
credit against any money the injured employee owes to the employer or carrier. If it is not | 
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a credit, the carrier does not pay any portion of the fees and costs. The injured employee 
carries the complete burden of the fees and costs. Th<* compensation carrier in reality 
receives a benefit for no cost or risk. Applying the statute as Judge Sims did, provides an 
injured employee some incentive to bring a lawsuit agcins^a liable third party, which justly 
requires the liable party to bear the responsibility for the injury or death. 
In any event, nothing is paid "twice" as alleged by CNA. The Applicants pay 
the fees and costs "once" when they pay them to the attorneys. Applicants thereafter get 
their statutory "credit" for these fees based upon the proportionate share of fees and costs 
payable by CNA. In this particular case, the proportionate share of fees and costs of CNA 
happens to be 100%. Because the credit for attorneys' fees and costs far exceeded the 
Applicants' recovery that was payable to CNA, the Administrative Law Judge appropriately 
determined that CNA was not entitled to any reimbursement or offset. 
In some cases such as this, the worker's compensation carrier may not receive 
any benefit from the third party lawsuit, but one can hardly consider the benefits received 
by the Applicants, including the worker's compensation benefits, adequate to compensate 
them for the loss of their husband, son and father. However, this is an unusual situation. 
In this case, the attorneys' fee was 40% because of the difficult nature of the case and 
because it went to trial. Also, the cost of taking a products liability case to trial is 
enormous. Besides those factors, CNA had a large obligation because it involved a death 
on a worker with young minor children. Perhaps the most compelling reason for the results 
is the fact that the judgment was relatively small mostly because so much fault was 
attributed to the employer. 
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However, the formula does work and it is fair. Consider how it would have 
>
 > > > > > 
work under the circumstance of the settlement in tbfe previous lawsajt pgainst the Freeport 
Center. In that lawsuit, $375,000 was paid in settlement by the Freeport Center. The 
attorneys' fees and costs were $131,736.6 leaving $243,263.84 available to distribute. CNA's 
interest was approximately $265,980 ($341 per week for 15 years). Here again CNA's 
interest exceeded the available money. Therefore, CNA's proportional share of costs and 
fees would have been 100% or $131,736.16. Since all of the available money would have 
been CNA's minus it's proportionate share of costs and fees, CNA would have received a 
benefit of approximately $111,527.68 from the settlement ($243,263.84 - $131,736.16). 
Let's compare that to the actually benefit CNA received from that settlement. 
CNA received $8,263.84 in reimbursement and an offset of $136 per week for approximately 
fourteen (14) years or an additional $99,008 benefit for a total benefit of $107,271.84. In 
that case, CNA actually agreed to accept less of a benefit than the formula used by Judge 
Sims would have given it. The difference was the settlement was greater than the judgment, 
but the fees and costs were less even though CNA would have been responsible for 100% 
of the fees and costs in both cases. 
POINT III 
THE APPROPRIATE METHOD OF REDUCING WORKERS 
COMPENSATION CARRIER'S SHARE OF PROCEEDS 
BECAUSE OF FAULT ATTRIBUTABLE TO EMPLOYER. 
The Administrative Law Judge's Order made a cursory analysis of the 
provisions of § 36-l-62(5)(b)(ii), which requires a reduction equal to the percentage fault 
attributed to the employer and his employee in any amounts paid to reimburse the insurer. 
See, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order at p.6. Our reading of this 
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subsection, in light of the dictates of Worthen v. Shurtleff and Andrews, Inc., 426 P.2d 223, 
> > > •> > > 
* > > > > » 
> > > > > > > > 
(Utah 1967), compels us to conclude that the "fault" jadjustmeht is to' be! made after reducing | 
the insurer's right to reimbursement by its proportionate share of the third party litigation 
fees and costs. Thus, the Defendants' right to reimbursement and offset must be reduced 
by its share of fees and costs and further reduced by the 75% liability attributed to the 
employer, Redd Roofing, and its employee, Mr. Esquivel, under the statute. However, since | 
the credit available to the Applicants for CNA'S proportionate share of costs and fees ' 
exceeds the money available for reimbursement and offset, further reduction is unnecessary. I 
CONCLUSION 
The Administrative Law Judge correctly applied Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-62(5) i 
in apportioning the attorneys' fees and costs incurred in obtaining the judgment against the 
third party. Therefore, the Applicants respectfully request that defendants' Motion for 
Review of Order be denied and that Judge Sims' Order be affirmed in its entirety. 
Dated this 2nd day of April, 1997. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
* > > > ) > 
> > > > > > 
I hereby certify that a true and cortett copy qf AppKqaijts' RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR REVIEW OF ORDER was sewed upon the counsel of 
record at the address listed below, by depositing same into first class United States mail, 
postage prepaid, on this 2nd day of April, 1997. 
Theodore E. Kanell 
Attorney for Defendants 
Hanson, Epperson & Smith 
4 Triad Center, #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
Legal Secretary 
Q-\WP51\CLIENT\1513\F\RESPV WPD 
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Exhibit 5 
35-1-62 LABOR — INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
35-1-62. Injuries or death caused by wrongful acts of per-
sons other than employer, officer, agent, or em-
ployee of said employer — Rights of employer or 
insurance carrier in cause of action — Mainte-
nance of action — Notice of intention to proceed 
against third party — Right to maintain action 
not involving employee-employer relationship — 
Disbursement of proceeds of recovery. 
When any injury or death for which compensation is payable under this 
title shall have been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of a person other 
than an employer, officer, agent, or employee of said employer, the injured 
employee, or in case of death his dependents, may claim compensation and the 
injured employee or his heirs or personal representative may also have an 
action for damages against such third person. If compensation is claimed and 
the employer or insurance carrier becomes obligated to pay compensation, the 
employer or insurance carrier shall become trustee of the cause of action 
against the third party and may bring and maintain the action either in its 
own name or in the name of the injured employee, or his heirs or the personal 
representative of the deceased, provided the employer or carrier may not 
settle and release the cause of action without the consent of the commission. 
Before proceeding against the third party, the injured employee, or, in case of 
death, his heirs, shall give written notice of such intention to the carrier or 
other person obligated for the compensation payments, in order to give such 
person a reasonable opportunity to enter an appearance in the proceeding. 
For the purposes of this section and notwithstanding the provisions of Sec-
tion 35-1-42, the injured employee or his heirs or personal representative may 
also maintain an action for damages against subcontractors, general contrac-
tors, independent contractors, property owners or their lessees or assigns, not 
occupying an employee-employer relationship with the injured or deceased 
employee at the time of his injury or death. 
If any recovery is obtained against such third person it shall be disbursed as 
follows: 
(1) The reasonable expense of the action, including attorneys' fees, 
shall be paid and charged proportionately against the parties as their 
interests may appear. Any such fee chargeable to the employer or carrier 
is to be a credit upon any fee payable by the injured employee or, in the 
case of death, by the dependents, for any recovery had against the third 
party. 
(2) The person liable for compensation payments shall be reimbursed 
in full for all payments made less the proportionate share of costs and 
attorneys' fees provided for in Subsection (1). 
(3) The balance shall be paid to the injured employee or his heirs in 
case of death, to be applied to reduce or satisfy in full any obligation 
thereafter accruing against the person liable for compensation. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 72; C.L. 1917, L. 1946, ch. 65, § 1; 1971, ch. 76, § 3; 1973, 
§ 3133; L. 1921, ch. 100, § 1; R.S. 1933, ch. 67, § 7; 1975, ch. 101, § 3. 
42-1-58; L. 1939, ch. 51, § 1; C. 1943, 42-1-58; 
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Exhibit 6 
Mathematical Analysis of Petitioners' Proposed Formula 
gross judgment 
r n n t " l ri' Ji-Mil | i i > i „ n I 
costs 
carrier lien = L 
attorney fees = contingent rate x gross judgment 
i i = t j i ldgn lei i t gross judgmei. 
minus cos t s 
t o t a l expenses p i ".i::' • •'' nt" 
[1] Under the petitioners' proposed formula, the carrier's 
"proportionate" share of the expenses is the carrier 1ien (L) 
divided by the net judgment. In other words: 
c a r r i e r p rop o r t: i o i i 
j (1 - r) 1 : 
[2] The expenses charged to the carrier equal the carrier's 
proportionate share times the total expenses: 
carrier charged expenses x (j (r) i k) 
carrier charged expenses 
j (r) i k 
1 ,„ :; :  
j [• I t ) 1 : 
As established in step [3] on the previous page, 
j (r) + k 
carrier charged expenses = L x 
j (1 - r) - k 
[4] The costs (k) will always be a positive number. Therefore, 
j (r) + k > j (r) 
and j (1 - r) - k < j ( l - r ) 
[5] In a fraction, if the numerator decreases but the denomin-
ator stays the same, the quotient will decrease (as long as the 
numerator and denominator are both positive). Similarly, if the 
numerator remains constant and the denominator increases, the 
quotient also decreases. And if both occur -- the numerator 
decreases and the denominator increases -- the quotient will 
decrease even more. 
[6] Therefore, 
j (r) + k j (r) 
j (1 - r) - k j (1 - r) 
[I.e., because the fraction on the left has both a 
higher numerator and a lower denominator than the 
fraction on the right, it will necessarily have a 
higher value than the fraction on the right] 
[7] So, because L is always positive 
j (r) + k j (r) 
L x > L x 
j (1 - r) - k j (1 - r) 
[8] But as established back in step [3] and as shown at the top 
of this page, the left side of equation [7] is the same as the 
carrier's charged expenses. So 
j(r) 
carrier charged expenses > L x 
j (1 - r) 
carrier charged expenses > I« x ---
j(l • r) 
T 1 :i :i s :: a i i 1: e i: e d i i c e d c • i i e s t: e p f i i r 11 i e i: i 
c a r r i e r cha rged expei ises 
1 - r 
Liuj in other words, the expenses charged to the car rier under 
the petitioners1 proposed formula will always be greater than 
L x 
1 
[11] Applying this formula, if the contingent fee rate is 40 
percent (0.4), then the carrier's share of the expenses will 
always be greater than, 
0.4 
1 0 . 4 
P' l - ^'ri-r be charged at iedbL 
0 .4 
[13] Or, the carrier's expenses will be at least 
2 
L x ---
3 
In other words, with a forty percent contingent fee, the 
carrier will always be charged at least two-thirds of its lien as 
its "proportionate" share of expenses! (Also, note that the 
higher the costs, the more the carrier's share will exceed two-
thirds of its lien. Thus, in our case, the carrier's share 
supposedly exceeds the entire amount of its lien.) 
[14] Similarly, with a contingent fee of one-third (.33), the 
carrier will always be charged at least 
0.333 
L x 
1 - .333 
[15] So the carrier's expenses will be greater than 
0.333 
L x 
0.666 
[16] Or, the carrier will always be charged at least 
1 
L x 
2 
So even with a one-third contingent fee, the carrier will 
always be charged at least half of its lien as its "proportion-
ate" share of the expenses. (This is the situation posed by the 
hypothetical in Breen v. Caesar's Palace, 715 P.2d 1070 (Nev. 
1986) . 
